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ADDICTION, GENETICS, AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
STEPHEN J. MORSE*
It is clear that genes build proteins, but God only knows what happens next . . . . If you
want to know how the mind works, you should investigate the mind; not the brain, and
1
still less the genome. . . .

I
INTRODUCTION
An immense proportion of alleged felons are under the influence of mindaltering substances when they are arrested, and many people arrested for drug
offenses and other crimes are addicted.2 Indeed, possession and use of illicit
substances, which are necessary criteria of addiction,3 are crimes in every state
and under federal law. Assessing the moral and legal responsibility of agents
who engage in such behavior is thus of paramount importance in our criminal
Copyright © 2006 by Stephen J. Morse
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* Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology and Law in
Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania.
This paper was first presented at a conference, “The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the Criminal
Law,” at the Duke Law School. I thank Ed Greenlee for invaluable help. As always, my personal
attorney, Jean Avnet Morse, provided sound, sober counsel and moral support.
1. Jerry Fodor, Crossed Wires, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, May 16, 2003 at 3.
2. See ZHIWEI ZHANG, NAT’L OPINION RES. CENTER, DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE AND
RELATED MATTERS AMONG ARRESTEES tbls. 3, 9 & 10 (2003) (showing that 73.9% of male adult
arrestees in thirty-nine cities tested positive for alcohol or at least one of nine controlled substances,
that 37% had engaged in the heavy use of controlled substances and 39.1% were at risk for drug
dependence, and that 47.9% had engaged in heavy drinking within the past thirty days and 28.6% were
at risk for alcohol dependence). I recognize that there is no consensual, scientifically or clinically
operationalized definition of “addiction” and that the diagnostic and statistical manual of the American
Psychiatric Association uses the terms “substance dependence” and “substance abuse” to refer to
substance-related disorders. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., text rev. 2000). Toward the extremes of drug use behavior, however,
addiction could be characterized as Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart characterized “hard core”
pornography: Even if we can’t define it, we know it when we see it. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964). For ease of exposition, the term addiction will be used throughout the paper. Also for ease
of exposition, addictions will be treated as limited to substance-related problems. Many believe that
addictions encompass nonsubstance activities, such as gambling, and there is research evidence
supporting this position. See Jon E. Grant et al, Multicenter Investigation of the Opioid Antagonist
Nalmefene in the Treatment of Pathological Gambling, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 303 (2006) (finding that
an opioid antagonist successfully reduces the symptoms associated with pathological gambling,
suggesting that the disorder is not about gambling but about addiction in general). This position
remains controversial, however, and arguing for it is unnecessary for the purposes of the present paper.
3. See Eric J. Nestler, Genes and Addiction, 26 NATURE GENETICS 277, 277 (2000) (“Drug
addiction . . . is defined solely in behavioural terms. For example, addiction can be considered . . .
compulsive drug-seeking and -taking despite horrendous consequences.”). This definition is discussed
further infra.
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justice system. But understanding the moral and legal responsibility of people
for becoming addicted and for criminal conduct associated with their addictions
has unfortunately been hindered by inadequate understanding of how
explanatory models of addiction relate to responsibility. Even sophisticated
people tend to think that the “man with the golden arm” is somehow an
automaton, a puppet pulled by the narcotic strings of a biological disease, and
that therefore the addict is not responsible for actions associated with his
addiction. Evidence linking a genetic predisposition for this condition
contributes powerfully, often confusingly, to this type of thinking.4 Conversely,
many people think that addiction is purely a result of moral weakness. The
various characterizations of addiction may be striking and contain a grain of
truth, and many models have great heuristic power. For the law’s purposes,
however, the metaphors and models often obscure rather than clarify issues of
criminal responsibility and of social policy generally in response to the deviant
behavior many addicts exhibit.
This article has two simple underlying theses. The first is that it is
impossible to understand the relation of any variable to criminal responsibility
without having in place an account of criminal responsibility. The second is that
discovery of genetic or of any other physical or psychosocial cause of action
raises no new issues concerning responsibility, and discovery of such causes
does not per se create an excusing or mitigating condition for criminal conduct
or any other type of behavior.
This article begins in Part II with a brief description of the phenomenology
of addiction, describing generally what is known about the behavioral aspects of
addiction in addition to the basic criteria of craving, seeking, and using.
Thinking sensibly about the relation of addiction to criminal responsibility is
impossible unless it is first understood that this condition is “defined solely in
behavioural terms.”5 Part III addresses the contrast between the legal and
scientific images of behavior, using the disease concept of addiction, now fueled
by discoveries of genetic predisposition, as a prime example of the contrast.
Part IV offers a general model of criminal responsibility to guide the
analysis of responsibility for addiction-related criminal behavior, offering the
best positive account of the present system. The model’s essential criteria are
behavioral, broadly understood to refer to actions and mental states. Part V
deals with persistent confusions about responsibility. Part VI describes those
aspects of addiction, if any, for which persons might be held morally or legally
responsible, concluding that only actions related to addiction are appropriate
objects for ascribing criminal responsibility. Part VII addresses the causal role
genetics plays in explaining addiction. This discussion is deferred until this

4. See generally Johannes Keller, In Genes We Trust: The Biological Component of Psychological
Essentialism and Its Relationship to Mechanisms of Motivated Social Cognition, 88 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 686 (2005) (validating a scale to measure the belief in genetic determinism and
demonstrating that such a belief affects social cognition).
5. Nestler, supra note 3, at 277.
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point because, as earlier parts explain, no particular causal explanation of any
behavior, including a biological explanation, entails necessary legal
consequences. In particular, the existence of a genetic explanation for addiction
does not demonstrate that addicts are not acting when they seek and use
substances or engage in other activities related to their addiction and a genetic
explanation produces no necessary legal conclusion concerning responsibility
for such addiction-related actions.
Finally, Part VIII considers individual and social responsibility for the
addiction-related actions. It begins by discussing in detail the meaning of those
features of addiction—subjective craving and compulsion—that seem the most
likely predicates for excuse or mitigation. It argues that understanding the
biological roots of craving does not yet yield valid information concerning the
strength of craving and seemingly compulsive behavior. This part next
addresses the two leading theoretical and legal candidates for an excusing
condition—internal coercion and lack of the capacity for rationality. It
concludes that most addicts should be responsible for most criminal behavior
motivated by addiction, but that addiction can in some cases affect the agent’s
ability “to grasp and be guided by reason.”6 The last section of this part
considers whether society is responsible for addiction-related actions. It
concludes that even if most addicts should be held responsible for addictionrelated behavior, sensible social policy can do much to reduce both the
prevalence of addiction and concomitant criminal behavior. The final part of
the paper discusses three legal proposals for reducing the costs associated with
addictions and for treating addicts fairly.
The paper throughout makes the simplifying assumption that addicts are not
responsible for becoming addicted. If the addict is responsible for becoming
addicted, then it is less problematic to hold the addict responsible for the
foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences of becoming addicted.7 As
everyone concedes, becoming addicted virtually always involves intentional
action. The addict must have intentionally used the substance, usually for
prolonged periods. If the addict is responsible for substance use, then,
arguably, she is also responsible for setting in motion those mechanistic,
biophysical processes that partially cause addiction and that are activated or
potentiated by using substances. The relation of genetic or other biological
causation to responsibility then becomes much less important and interesting.
Consequently, to raise the issues most starkly and most sympathetically to the

6. This felicitous phrase is borrowed from Jay Wallace’s superb book on responsibility. R. JAY
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994). Wallace treats the phrase as
encompassing both rationality and control defects. I prefer to limit it to the former, however, and will
suggest that most control defects can be assimilated to rationality defects.
7. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (upholding the constitutionality of a state
statute excluding evidence of intoxication relevant to whether the defendant in fact had the subjective
mens rea required by the definition of the crime). I firmly reject such partial or complete strict liability,
but it is a common feature of the criminal law. See Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from
Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 254 (1998).
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view that biological causation may play an excusing role, it is assumed that
addicts are not responsible for becoming addicted. This assumption is relaxed
primarily in Part VIII.B, which discusses whether addicts should be excused
because addiction compromises their rational capacities. A postscript considers
in detail whether addicts are responsible for becoming addicted.
II
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ADDICTION
Here, in common-sense terms, is what we know about the phenomenology
of addiction.8 A later section considers in detail attempts to define more
precisely some of the key terms, such as “craving” and “compulsive.”
Some people use substances for which they develop an extremely intense,
insistent level of subjective desire that is apparently satisfied only temporarily
by use. After the addict satisfies the craving by use, the desire to use substances
quickly reasserts itself and the agent again desires to use very intensely.
Addicts typically engage in repetitive seeking and using behavior, even though
the drug-related actions threaten and often cause adverse, frequent, and
horrendous social, health, and legal consequences. Addicts have very good
long-term reasons not to engage in drug seeking and use, but they tend to be
steep time discounters when they evaluate drug seeking and using. For some,
use may be rational in the short-term. Addicts do not seem to learn from
experience, however. Thus, many continue to use and to imperil their lives.
Most are ambivalent about their addictions. For some, the craving is so strong
that seeking and using the substance becomes a central life activity and even
central to the addict’s identity. Many, and perhaps most, who quit will relapse,
especially if the “drug life” has compromised functional social networks and
skills.
It can be inferred from the addict’s report about his or her own thoughts and
feelings and from the negative consequences of addiction-related actions that
the addict is driven by an overwhelming or overpowering desire termed
“craving” and that drug seeking and using are “compulsive.” But the
environment and expectations play a weighty role in the addict’s experience of
craving and use. Addiction is a condition that is eliminated by large numbers of
craving sufferers simply by intentionally ceasing to seek and use, and many
cease craving after they quit. In many cases, the addict is able to quit because
she finally has sufficient reason to do so, and many addicts “age out” of
addiction. Even if addiction is properly and most usefully characterized as a
disease, at the extreme its necessary behavioral signs are virtually all rewardsensitive or reason-responsive. An addict threatened with instant death for

8. What follows in this part is boilerplate among addiction researchers. Support can be found in
the many scientific studies of addiction cited in this article and in many first-person accounts of
addiction. Part VIII.A., infra, addresses attempts by scientists to define craving and compulsion more
precisely.
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seeking and using will not seek and use unless she already wishes to die at that
moment or does not care if she does.9
III
IMAGES OF ADDICTION
The concepts of illness and disease have powerful associations in our
culture, most of which are inconsistent with the sufferer’s responsibility for the
features of the illness. People can, of course, be responsible for initially
contracting or risking contracting diseases. A person who is overweight, does
not exercise, and smokes surely is responsible for risking hypertension; the
person who in inappropriate circumstances engages in unprotected sexual
activity surely risks contracting sexually transmitted diseases. And a person
who suffers from many diseases can ameliorate the consequences by
intentionally adhering to a prescribed medical regimen. But hypertension and
infections are themselves mechanisms. The sufferer cannot terminate all the
signs and symptoms of the disease simply by intentionally choosing to cease
being hypertensive or infected.
Despite the potential contribution of human agency to the cause and
maintenance of some diseases, no one denies that these are fundamentally
diseases. Moreover, with many and perhaps most diseases, the sufferer is not
responsible for contracting the disease, and for many diseases there is little or
nothing the sufferer can do to help, other than to seek and cooperate with
professional help and to wait for the disease to run its course. Although people
sometimes can be complicit in their own diseases, the disease model is so
powerful that people who are ill are not in general considered responsible for
the signs, symptoms, and consequences. The dominant image of people with
diseases is that they are the victims of pathological mechanisms who deserve
sympathy and help and do not deserve condemnation.
The brain disease model of addiction borrows heavily from the powerful
moral and social associations of the general concepts of illness and disease. It
claims that addiction is a chronic and relapsing brain disease.10 Supported by
highly technical anatomical, physiological, and genetic research demonstrating
that addictions appear to have a biological basis, the brain disease model
inevitably suggests that the addict is sick. The signs and symptoms of the
disease—primarily compulsive drug seeking and use—are seemingly the
mechanistic consequence of genetically-driven pathological brain anatomy and
physiology over which the addict has no control once prolonged use has caused
the pathology. The following are recent excellent examples of this mode of
9. The ability of many addicts to decide to quit and to be responsive to contingencies generally is
an inconvenient fact for those who wish to conceptualize addiction as purely a brain disease. People do
not stop being diabetics, for example, simply by deciding that their pancreases should produce more
natural insulin nor does cancer abate because people have good reason to be free of this terrible
disease. See infra Parts III & VI.
10. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 1 FOCUS 190 (2003).
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The first is by an eminent

Dramatic advances over the past two decades in both the neurosciences and the
behavioral sciences have revolutionized our understanding of drug abuse and
addiction. Scientists have identified neural circuits that subsume the actions of every
known drug of abuse, and they have specified common pathways that are affected by
almost all such drugs. Researchers have also identified and cloned the major
receptors for virtually every abusable drug, as well as the natural ligands for most of
those receptors. In addition, they have elaborated many of the biochemical cascades
within the cell that follow receptor activation by drugs. Research has also begun to
reveal major differences between the brains of addicted and nonaddicted individuals
11
and to indicate some common elements of addiction, regardless of the substance.

The second is by an addiction researcher:
Addiction is a disorder of the brain’s reward system. Functional imaging shows the
vulnerable circuitry for addiction originating in the paleocortex. Paradoxically,
humankind’s greatest adaptive advantage, the neocortex, responsible for the
phenomenon of consciousness, is at best only minimally protective from addictive
disease and may pose a hurdle for recovery. Unlike most medical disorders, in
addiction a net effect of supraphysiologic reward, impaired inhibition, or both
paradoxically leads the limbic drive system to reinforce exposure to the disease vector.
This is in direct violation of the principle of survival of the species. In individuals with
underlying vulnerabilities, limbic drive progressively recruits neocortical function to
protect continued access to abused substances, the polar opposite of
12
self-preservation.

The first example, despite the concession to the behavioral sciences in its first
sentence, describes solely biological advances, and the remainder of the article
fails to note one “dramatic advance” in the behavioral understanding of
addiction.13 The second example treats the intentional conduct of the addict
solely as the product of brain mechanisms. There is no person present, no agent
acting when the “organism” seeks and uses.
For those whose thinking is driven by the brain disease model, this image is
applauded and promoted. For example, an editorial in the American Journal of
Psychiatry opens as follows:
American psychiatry has made remarkable progress in recategorizing the addictive
disorders from moral failures to brain diseases, but the need for community education
continues. The concept of moral failure is by no means gone from the discussion of
addictive disorders, as evidenced by our country’s investment in criminal justice rather
14
than treatment . . . .

Such thinking can reflect in part battles over turf, funding, and the like, but it is
doubtlessly sincerely motivated.
Virtually all mechanistic models of problems that bedevil society, including
the medical model, are alluring because they imply that there are technical,
11. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45, 45 (1997).
12. David R. Gastfriend, Physician Substance Abuse and Recovery: What Does it Mean for
Physicians—and Everyone Else, 293 JAMA 1513, 1514 (2005) (citation omitted).
13. Leshner, supra note 11.
14. Thomas R. Kosten, Addiction as a Brain Disease, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 711, 711 (1998);
accord Alan I. Leshner, Science is Revolutionizing Our View of Addiction—and What to Do About It,
156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1999).
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“clean” solutions. Fix the “pathological mechanism,” fix the social problem it
produces; do not worry about refractory human behavior and messy moral
accountability. The medical model is used here for rhetorical purposes because
it is much in the news, and because there is heartening progress in the biological
understanding of addiction. But any black-box mechanical model of the
phenomenon of addiction would have done as well.
Criminal law’s concept of the person, including the addict, is the antithesis
of the medical model’s mechanistic concept. Although all honest people will
admit that biological and environmental variables beyond the person’s rational
control can cause an agent to be the type of person who is predisposed to
commit crimes or can put the agent in the kind of environment that predisposes
people to criminal activity, the law ultimately views the criminal wrongdoer as
an agent and not simply as a passive victim who manifests pathological
mechanisms.15 Unless either the person does not act or an excusing condition is
present, agency entails moral and legal responsibility that warrants blame and
punishment. Suffering from a disease simpliciter, such as schizophrenia, does
not itself mean that the defendant did not act or that an excusing condition
obtained, although diseases and other causes may negate action or produce an
excusing condition, such as gross irrationality. Most mental and physical
diseases—even severe disorders—suffered by people who violate the criminal
law do not have these exculpating effects because they do not sufficiently affect
rational agency concerning criminal activity.16 Even if addiction is properly
characterized as an illness, most addicts are nonetheless capable of being guided
by good reasons, including the incentives law can provide.17 Sick people who
behave immorally or who violate the criminal law are almost always responsible
agents.
Why does it matter if we conceptualize drug-related problems medically as
the product of genetic predisposition and a brain disease? After all, drugs
undoubtedly cause vast and often catastrophic personal and social misery, and
perhaps the program of research and intervention the biological disease model
implies can ameliorate the misery. Why should internecine disputes among
philosophers of biology and medicine about the status of the disease concept, or
15. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), a case involving a chronic alcoholic convicted of being
drunk in public, the Supreme Court held that a defense of “compulsion symptomatic of a disease” was
not constitutionally required. The Court wrote that public drunkenness was behavior, and thus unlike
the simple status of being addicted, and it refused to hold that criminal blame and punishment were
constitutionally impermissible under the circumstances. Indeed, Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion
observed that it was not irrational to respond to public drunkenness with the criminal sanction. Id. at
527–31. The plurality also pointed out that Powell’s own cross-examination at trial suggested that he
was not powerless to stop drinking after he had taken his first drink. Id. at 519–21.
16. Mental disorders, even severe mental disorders, seldom negate the act requirement for criminal
culpability and equally rarely negate either the mens rea required by the definition of crimes or the
intentionality of unlawful conduct. See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 189, 210 (1999) (considering the act requirement); Stephen J. Morse, Craziness and Criminal
Responsibility, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L., 147, 161–64 (1999) (concerning mens rea).
17. See SALLY L. SATEL & FREDERICK K. GOODWIN, ETHICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., IS DRUG
ADDICTION A BRAIN DISEASE? 20–21 (1998).
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the law’s model of the person, or the pure moralizing of many stand in the way?
They should not, of course; nothing should stand in the way of useful research
and interventions. Unfortunately, however, otherwise useful images or models
can have negative consequences if they exceed their rightful boundaries. The
wrong images in an inapt domain can produce misguided policies.
Whether the law should treat addiction as a disease and what that would
mean are open conceptual and practical questions. Let us begin by examining
the law’s model of responsibility ascription.
IV
THE MODEL OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The criteria for criminal responsibility, like the criteria for addiction, are
entirely behavioral. An agent is criminally responsible if his or her intentional
action, accompanied by an appropriate mental state, satisfies the definition of a
criminal offense. If the agent does not act at all because her bodily movement is
not intentional—for example, a reflex or spasmodic movement—then there is
no violation of the prohibition. There is also no violation in cases in which the
agent’s intentional action satisfies the offense’s act definition, but the mental
state required by the definition is lacking. In Anglo-American criminal law, an
agent unjustifiably violating a criminal prohibition will be held not responsible
and legally excused if she was incapable of rationality or was metaphorically
compelled to act by being placed in a “do-it-or-else,” hard-choice situation.18
Note that in cases of metaphorical compulsion, unlike cases of no action, the
agent does act intentionally. Infancy and legal insanity are doctrinal examples
of rationality excuses; duress is an example of a hard-choice excuse. The
criteria for the excusing conditions—lack of rational capacity and sufficiently
hard choice (compulsion)—are normative. The degree of rational capacity
required for responsibility and how hard choices must be to excuse can differ in
response to changing moral conceptions and material circumstances.
This account of criminal responsibility is most tightly linked to retributive
justifications of punishment, which hold that punishment is not justified unless
the offender morally deserves punishment because the offender was at fault and
responsible, and that the offender never should be punished more than she
deserves. It is generally conceded that desert is at least a necessary
precondition for punishment in Anglo-American law.19 The account is also
consistent with consequential justifications for punishment, such as general
deterrence. No offender, including an addict, should be punished unless he or

18. A justification exists if action that would otherwise be criminal is right or permissible under the
circumstances. Self-defense is an example. An excuse exists if the agents acts wrongfully, but the agent
is not responsible for his or her conduct. Legal insanity is an example. See Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984) (distinguishing
justification and excuse and examining the often hazy boundaries between them).
19. Exceptions, such as strict liability, are few and highly controversial precisely because they
permit punishment in the absence of fault.
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she at least deserves such punishment. Even if good consequences might be
achieved by punishing non-responsible addicts or by punishing responsible
addicts more than they deserve, such punishment would require very weighty
justification in a system that takes desert seriously.
This brief description is arguably the most accurate positive account of the
current, dominant Anglo-American conception of responsibility. One might
quibble about details,20 but the basic thesis—that responsibility is based on
ordinary, common-sense behavioral criteria such as action, mental states, and
rationality, and that responsibility is tied to desert—is accurate. Now, many
people become confused about these criteria when they consider newly
discovered scientific evidence concerning the causation of behavior or if they
have more fundamental metaphysical doubts about the legitimacy of criminal
responsibility and consequent deserved punishment. As the next part argues,
such concerns are dangerous distractions that either confuse analysis or prove
too much by threatening all conceptions of responsibility.
V
DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING RESPONSIBILITY
A persistent but confused (and confusing) thought is that discovery of
genetic or other biological causes implicates the free will versus determinism
debate, and, relatedly, that causation is per se an excusing condition.21 That
determinism threatens responsibility is a truism. Although no one can know if
determinism or something close to it is true, let us assume that it is. After all,
the universe is massively regular above the sub-atomic level, and it would be
strange indeed if the phenomena of the universe were mostly or entirely
random or indeterministic.22
The alleged incompatibility of determinism and responsibility is
foundational. Determinism is not a continuum concept that applies to various
individuals in various degrees. There is no partial or selective determinism.
Responsibility is possible or it is not, tout court, if the universe is deterministic.
If human beings are fully subject to the causal laws of the universe, as a
thoroughly physicalist, naturalist worldview holds, then many philosophers

20. For example, there is a debate about whether justified conduct violates a moral or criminal
prohibition. Some argue that justifiable conduct violates no prima facie obligation. See MICHAEL
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 31–33, 64–67 (1997)
(arguing that justification should be treated as part of the “special part” of the criminal law). A more
formalistic criminal law analysis holds that justified conduct does violate a prima facie criminal
prohibition, but ultimately the conduct is judged right or at least permissible. In either case, illicit drug
activity is almost never justified under current legal doctrine.
21. See, e.g., Comm. on Addictions of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Responsibility
and Choice in Addiction, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 707, 708 (2002) (pointing to genetic and biological
factors responsible for addiction and suggesting that partial determinism or causation provides a partial
excuse).
22. Galen Strawson calls this assumption the “realism constraint.” Galen Strawson, Consciousness,
Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3, 12 (1989). If the universe were
indeterministic or random, it would hardly provide a secure foundation for responsibility.
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claim that “ultimate” responsibility is impossible from the start.23 On the other
hand, plausible “compatibilist” theories suggest that responsibility is possible in
a deterministic universe.24 There seems no resolution to this debate in sight, but
our moral and legal practices do not treat everyone or no one as responsible.
Determinism cannot be guiding our practices. If one wants to excuse addicts
because they are genetically determined or determined for any other reason to
be addicts, one is committed to negating the possibility of responsibility for
anything.
Our criminal responsibility criteria and practices have nothing to do with
determinism or with the necessity of having so-called “free will.” Criminal
responsibility involves evaluation of intentional, conscious, and potentially
rational human action. And almost no one in the debate about determinism
and free will or responsibility argues that we are not conscious, intentional,
potentially rational creatures when we act. We may be deterministically caused
to be the type of creature that acts intentionally, but determinism is not
inconsistent conceptually or logically with the possibility of mind-brain
causation of behavior. The truth of determinism does not entail that actions
and non-actions are indistinguishable and that there is no distinction between
rational and non-rational actions or compelled and uncompelled actions.
Children are less rational than adults; most people most of the time do not act
under severe threats. Our current responsibility concepts and practices use
criteria consistent with and independent of determinism.
A related confusion is that once a non-intentional causal explanation has
been identified for action, the person must be excused. In other words, the
claim is that causation and responsibility are inconsistent and that causation per
se is an excusing condition. This is sometimes called the “causal theory of
excuse.” Thus, if one identifies genetic, neurophysiological, or other causes for
behavior, then allegedly the person is not responsible. In a thoroughly physical
world, however, this claim is either identical to the incompatibilist critique of
responsibility and furnishes a foundational critique of all responsibility, or it is
simply an error. I term this the “fundamental psycholegal error” because it is
erroneous and, indeed, incoherent as a description of our practices.25 Noncausation of behavior is not and could not be a criterion for responsibility
because all behaviors, like all other phenomena, are caused. Causation, even by
abnormal physical variables, is not per se an excusing condition. Abnormal
physical variables, such as neurotransmitter deficiencies, may cause a genuine
excusing condition, such as the lack of rational capacity, but then the lack of

23. See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001).
24. See WALLACE, supra note 6; Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 437–44 (2004).
25. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994). Critics complain
that this argument is repeated in many of my writings. I plead guilty to the charge and will continue to
recidivate as long as people continue to manifest the confusion, as they routinely do. See Comm. on
Addictions, supra note 21, and Anders Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses, 83 NEB. L.
REV. 1116 (2005), for recent examples.
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rational capacity, not causation, is doing the excusing work. If causation were
an excuse, no one would be responsible for any action. Unless proponents of
the causal theory of excuse can furnish a convincing reason why causation per
se excuses, we have no reason to jettison responsibility practices that use other
criteria for responsibility and excuse.
In short, the burden of persuasion is on critics of the positive account of
responsibility that has been offered to guide our thinking about responsibility
and addiction. They must show either that it is an inaccurate account or that
our entire system of blame and punishment is normatively indefensible. Until
they accomplish this, they must work within the model. There can be
disagreement about how much lack of rational capacity excuses or how hard
choices must be to excuse, but determinism and causation are simply dangerous
distractions.
VI
ASPECTS OF ADDICTION; OBJECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY
Roughly speaking, addiction has four associated aspects or phenomena that
might be objects of responsibility ascription: anatomical states, physiological
states, psychological states, and actions.26 Among these, only action is a
potentially appropriate object of moral and legal responsibility ascription and a
justification for criminal punishment.27 For the most part, people are held
morally and legally responsible only for actions that are capable of being guided
by reason. Although anatomical and physiological states, including one’s
genetic make-up, may be evaluated as desirable or undesirable, they are
entirely or largely the product of mechanistic processes that are not under the
agent’s rational control. Those anatomical and physiological states that are
signs of addiction are simply statuses of the agent’s physical body and not
directly controllable through the person’s rational agency. Similarly, a
psychological state that is symptomatic of addiction, such as craving (or,
according to many, ambivalence), is likewise just a status that is mechanistically
produced by the underlying anatomical or physiological states associated with
addiction and, in many cases, by environmental cues.
Anatomical,
physiological, and psychological states are not intentional human actions.28
People may be responsible for the anatomical, physiological, and psychological
states associated with addiction if they are responsible for becoming addicted,

26. See HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 148 (1979).
27. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that criminal punishment solely for
the status of being addicted is cruel and unusual and thus constitutionally impermissible under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
28. Intentional mental acts do exist, of course. For example, intentionally adding two and two to
find the sum is an intentional act. But a subjective feeling of craving or compulsion is not per se a
mental act.
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but the criminal law still would not punish those states because they are solely
statuses.
The primary behavioral signs of addiction—seeking and using substances29—
are intentional human actions, even if they are also signs of a disease that has
genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes. Indeed, all intentional action has
genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes, whether or not the action is the
sign of a disease.30 The addict has an exceptionally powerful desire—a
craving—to consume the addictive substance, believes that consuming it will
satisfy that craving by avoiding pain, causing pleasure, or some combination of
the two, and therefore forms and acts on the intention to seek and to use the
substance. Such explanatory practical syllogisms are the mark of all intentional
actions.
Intentional action is the primary object of responsibility ascriptions.
Seeking and using and other associated actions may therefore be morally and
legally assessed. To assume that the addict is not responsible for addictionrelated behavior just because it has biological causes or because the action is the
sign of a disease generally commits the fundamental psycholegal error and
therefore begs the question of responsibility. It is natural to think people are
not responsible for signs and symptoms because mostly they are statuses
mechanistically caused. But human action is distinguishable. It is not simply a
status.
Before finally turning to the question of the responsibility of addicts, the
role that genetics plays in causing the actions associated with addiction first
must be understood. The next part undertakes that task.
VII
THE GENETIC ROLE IN THE CAUSATION OF ADDICTION-RELATED ACTIONS
Although environmental variables play an undeniably important role and
sometimes explain a majority of the variance in the addict’s behavior, the
variance in agents’ initial responses to a substance and the development of
craving appear to have a genetic biological substrate. Virtually all addiction
experts agree that addiction is a complex, heterogeneous phenotype, that many
genes contribute only small effects, that the expression of those genes may be
strongly influenced by the environment, that the heritability of most addictions
probably does not exceed fifty percent,31 and that the causal mechanisms are not
29. Jordi Cami & Magi Farré, Mechanisms of Disease: Drug Addiction, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 975
(2003); Leshner, supra note 11, at 46 (defining the “essence” of addiction as, “compulsive drug seeking
and use, even in the face of negative health and social consequences”); Nestler, supra note 3.
30. To claim otherwise is to deny the fundamental insight of biological physical naturalism that
Darwin so profoundly explained.
31. Heritability refers to the proportion of the variance of a trait, such as height, cognitive ability,
or the predisposition to find opiate use pleasurable, that can be attributed to genetic differences within
some specifically defined population under some specific set of conditions. It does not refer to how
much any individual person’s expression of that trait is explained by genetic causes. Estimates of
heritability in one defined population, say, males in a specific place, are not transferable to another
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yet well understood.32 Indeed, it is difficult to disentangle preexisting neural
vulnerabilities from the effects of chronic use.33 Despite the limitations in our
present understanding, experts believe that there is no single gene or interacting
set of genes that inevitably or even directly produce intentional seeking and
using of drugs.34 In general, complex behavioral traits, including those that are
the expressions of a disease, are rarely explained by a single gene.35
Addiction may be a disease with a genetic basis, but it is not like
Huntington’s disease or other single-gene diseases that involve the inevitable
and purely mechanistic expression of that gene. The genetic contributions to
addiction instead affect “intervening” variables that can predispose the person
to become addicted. For example, genetic factors may influence the agent’s
initial response to the substance; brain adaptations, including reward circuitry
and the degree to which the substance is rewarding; disinhibitory mechanisms;
physical dependence; and other variables that affect whether an agent who uses
substances, especially for a prolonged period, compulsively seeks and uses
because she is motivated by intense craving.36 In short, and colloquially, the
typically shorter-term “go” mechanisms of the brain are strengthened and the

defined population, say, females in another place. Also, heritability must be distinguished from
heritable. The latter refers to whether the expression of a trait is under some control by genes. In a
genetically homogeneous population, a trait might be heritable but have a heritability of zero because
genes do not explain variation in that population. In a population in which a trait is genetically
homogeneous, all variance in that trait in the population would be explained by nongenetic variables.
TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN NATURE
92 (2001).
32. E.g., ROBERT PLOMIN, JOHN C. DEFRIES, GERALD E. MCCLEARN, & PETER MCGUFFIN,
BEHAV. GENETICS 265–72 (4th ed. 2001); John C. Crabbe, Genetic Contributions to Addiction, 53 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 435, 437, 451–52 (2002); Mary Jeanne Kreek, David A. Nielson & K. Steven LaForge,
Genes Associated with Addiction: Alcohol, Opiate, and Cocaine Addiction, 5 NEUROMOLECULAR
MED. 85, 86 (2004); Nestler, supra note 3. Alcoholism is the most intensely studied addiction. Future
research will surely confirm a genetic contribution to addiction and provide increased understanding of
the causal mechanisms. See generally Anne M. Glazier, Joseph H. Nadeau & Timothy J. Altman,
Finding Genes that Underlie Complex Traits, 298 SCIENCE 2345, 2345–46 (2002)(proposing standards
for proof of discovery of genes for complex traits); Kenneth S. Kendler, Psychiatric Genetics: A
Methodological Critique, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 3 (2005) (reviewing the four major research
paradigms and proposing that they be better integrated with recognition of the strengths and
weaknesses of each).
33. Monique Ernst, Alane S. Kimes & Sandra Jazbec, Neuroimaging and Mechanisms of Drug
Abuse: Interface of Molecular Imaging and Molecular Genetics, 13 NEUROIMAGING CLINICS N. AM.
833, 839 (2003); see also Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, David Belin & Pier Vicenzo Piazza, Evidence
for Addiction-like Behavior in the Rat, 305 SCIENCE 1014, 1016–17 (2004) (stating the interaction of
phenotypical vulnerability and length of exposure explains the onset of addiction).
34. William M. Compton, Yonette F. Thomas, Kevin P. Conway & James D. Colliver,
Developments in the Epidemiology of Drug Use and Drug Use Disorders, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1494,
1498 (2005) (stating drug use disorders are “genetically and phenotypically complex” and arise from
“multiple genes exerting small effects,” and inter alia, “gene-by-environment” interactions).
35. Crabbe, supra note 32, at 437; EVA JABLONKA & MARION J. LAMB, EVOLUTION IN FOUR
DIMENSIONS: GENETIC, EPIGENETIC, BEHAVIORAL, AND SYMBOLIC VARIATION IN THE HISTORY OF
LIFE 6 (2005); see generally Terrie E. Moffitt, Avshalom Caspi & Michael Rutter, Strategy for
Investigating Interactions Between Measured Genes and Measured Environment, 62 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 473, 474–78 (2005) (describing strategies to test hypotheses about gene-environment
interactions).
36. E.g., Nestler, supra note 3, at 278.
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typically longer-term “stop” mechanisms are weakened.37 None of these
explanatory variables denies or is inconsistent, however, with the truth that
seeking and using drugs and other drug-related behaviors are intentional
actions.
It is of course possible that in many cases these addiction-predisposing
genetic variables might be affected by environmental causes and that genetics
might play only a trivial role. It would make no difference to the analysis of
responsibility, however, that the causes of the predisposition were
environmental rather than biological. Both the brain and the mind can be
changed by both biological and psychological variables, and environmental
causes may be every bit as powerful as biological causes. From the purely
causal perspective, a cause is just a cause.38 For the purpose of analysis,
however, let us make the simplifying assumption that genetic causes over which
the agent has no rational control always play a non-trivial role in causing the
anatomical, physiological, and psychological changes associated with prolonged
substance use and consequent addiction.
VIII
RESPONSIBILITY AND ADDICTION
An agent will not be held responsible for anatomical, physiological, or
psychological states associated with addiction, but the addict potentially may be
held responsible for addiction-associated actions such as possession, use, or
other crimes motivated by the desire to obtain and use drugs. Thus, the addict
must be evaluated as an acting agent, a person who acts for reasons, and not
simply as a biophysical mechanism. This would be true even if craving and
compulsive seeking and using drugs were the inevitable, mechanistic outcome
of a single-gene defect. The question, then, is how to assess the responsibility of
an agent acting intentionally and unlawfully, but apparently compulsively in
response to cravings.
The criminal actions of addicts are in fact actions, not mechanisms, even if
they may also be properly characterized as signs of disease or brain pathology,
and discovery of biological or psychosocial causes does not per se negate agency
and create an excusing condition. All actions have biological and nonbiological causes. The agent is not an addict unless the person seeks and uses
the drug. And when she seeks and uses, she acts. She is not legally
unconscious, even according to the most extravagantly narrow definition of
action, and she surely acts intentionally. Genetically induced pathology may be

37. See generally Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed
Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE 503, 505–06 (2004) (finding that different areas of the brain are
activated by short-term and long-term rewards; these findings are consistent with the view that our
“passions” particularly affect short-term reward choices).
38. See JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INTRODUCTION (2000) (providing a complete analysis of the indistinguishability of biological and
social causation as threats to personhood and ordinary responsibility).
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a prime source of a craving, and compulsive action to satisfy the craving may
produce harmful consequences, but activity to satisfy the craving for drugs is
nonetheless action. The core definition of addiction entails this.
The question, therefore, is whether addicts should be excused for their
addiction-related actions. This part begins an answer with consideration of
those features of addiction-related behavior—craving and compulsion—that are
most relevant to an assessment of the criminal law’s excusing conditions of lack
of rationality and legal compulsion. It continues by addressing the two primary
theoretical candidates for why actions motivated by cravings and compulsions
might be excused—the internal compulsion and irrationality theories. Finally, it
turns to society’s responsibility for addiction-related behaviors and whether
such responsibility negates or lessens individual responsibility.
A. The Meaning of Craving and Compulsion
This article previously explored the phenomenology of addiction and has
implicitly accepted a common-sense understanding of craving and compulsion.
Now let us consider whether more precise clinical and scientific definitions of
craving and compulsion can be provided.
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, 4th Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR)39 does not use the
term “addiction” and does not make craving and compulsive seeking or using
necessary criteria of a substance disorder. Nonetheless, this article will consider
what this manual and other authoritative sources teach about these crucial
features of addiction.
DSM-IV-TR defines the generic “essential feature” of the class of substance
dependence disorders as, “a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological
symptoms indicating that the individual continues use of the substance despite
significant substance-related problems. There is a pattern of repeated selfadministration that usually results in tolerance, withdrawal, and compulsive
drug-taking behavior.”40 DSM-IV-TR does state, however, that “[a]lthough not
specifically listed as a criterion item, ‘craving’ (a strong subjective drive to use
the substance) is likely to be experienced by most (if not all) individuals with
Substance Dependence.”41
The International Classification of Disorders (ICD-10)42 describes the
dependence syndrome generically as follows:
A cluster of physiological, behavioural, and cognitive phenomena in which the use of a
substance or class of substances takes on a much higher priority for a given individual
than other behaviours that once had greater value. A central descriptive characteristic

39.
40.
41.
42.

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2.
Id. at 192.
Id.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND
BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS (1992).
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of the dependence syndrome is the desire (often strong, sometimes overpowering) to
43
take psychoactive drugs . . ., alcohol or tobacco.

Two specific but not necessary ICD-10 criteria for dependence are a “strong
desire or sense of compulsion to take the substance” and “difficulties in
controlling substance-taking behaviour.”44
With respect, these definitions of craving and related states are conclusory,
vague, and unoperationalized. This problem is not remedied by consulting
other analogous criteria or definitions. For example, DSM-IV-TR defines the
“essential feature” of an Impulse-Control Disorder as, “the failure to resist an
impulse, drive, or temptation to perform an act that is harmful to the person or
to others.”45 In its generic introduction to impulse-control disorders, the manual
continues: “For most of the disorders in this section, the individual feels an
increasing sense of tension or arousal before committing the act and then
experiences pleasure, gratification, or relief at the time of committing the act.”46
Again, this definition may be related in a loose way to what one might mean by
craving or compulsion, but it is surely over inclusive as a precise definition of
these terms.
Finally, DSM-IV-TR’s formal use of the diagnostic term, “compulsion,”
which is defined as part of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, an anxiety disorder,
bears little relation to compulsive drug seeking and using. Compulsions are
defined generically as:
repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking) or mental acts (e.g.,
praying, counting, repeating words silently) the goal of which is to prevent or reduce
anxiety or distress, not to provide pleasure or gratification. In most cases, the person
feels driven to perform the compulsion to reduce the distress that accompanies an
obsession or to prevent some dreaded event or situation . . . . By definition,
compulsions are either clearly excessive or are not connected in a realistic way with
47
what they are designed to neutralize or prevent.

Addictive drug seeking and using is excessive, but it is surely realistically
designed to prevent anxiety and distress among addicts for whom this is the
primary motivation to take drugs. In either case, the compulsions of the person
with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder are distinguishable from the compulsions
experienced by an addict.
Neither “compulsion,” “compulsive,” nor “craving” is among the terms
included in DSM-IV-TR’s “Glossary of Technical Terms.”48 On the other hand,
the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Glossary does define
“compulsive” as follows: “Refers to intensity or repetitiveness of behavior

43. Id. at 75.
44. Id. According to ICD-10, it is thus possible to be diagnosed as dependent in the absence of any
analogue to “compulsive” behavior.
45. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2, at 663. This feature refers to “impulse control
disorders not elsewhere classified,” but DSM-IV-TR makes clear that other disorders, such as
substance-related disorders, “may have features that involve problems of impulse control.” Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 457; see also id. at 462 (listing the specific criteria).
48. Id. at 764–65.
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rather than to compulsive behavior strictly defined. Thus, ‘compulsive
drinking’ and ‘compulsive gambling’ refer to cravings that may be intense and
often repeated, but they are not viewed as compulsions.”49 Craving is not
defined, but this definition of “compulsive” does seem akin to the generic
definition of addiction under consideration.
However it is defined, the crucial criterial term, “compulsive,” is
frustratingly vague and dependent primarily on assessment of subjective states.
For example, DSM-IV-TR’s criterion for Impulse-Control Disorder—the
failure to resist a drive, impulse, or temptation to engage in harmful activity—
does not disclose whether the person is unable or unwilling to resist or how
hard it is to resist, nor does it indicate how harmful the act must be.50 Further,
the definition of Impulse-Control Disorder does not reveal how much inner
tension and how much release-seeking behavior is necessary to qualify for the
diagnosis of an impulse-control problem. ICD-10’s criterion of an “often
strong, sometimes overpowering” drive again does not specify how strong is
strong enough and what is meant by overpowering. In the case of either of
these criteria, if simply taking the drug repetitively (or, seemingly, taking it even
once if it leads to a predictably harmful outcome) is sufficient, then the
definition is essentially circular.
Such definitions will depend ultimately on a subjective assessment of the
strength of desires and a normative assessment of when the seeking and using
itself is sufficiently harmful to the agent to appear like a symptom, rather than
like a bad or even harmless habit or a hobby. And how bad it will be for the
agent will in turn depend a great deal on environmental variables that are
entirely independent of brain states, such as the cost, availability, and legality of
the substance.51
The definitional problems apparently can be remedied in various ways.
First, compulsion (or addiction) could be defined operationally in terms of
scores on various scales. There are many virtues to such an approach and it
should be applauded. Even if various scales are reliable, however, validity
problems will remain because there is no diagnostic gold standard. Moreover,
there is no consensual agreement on the scales. Second, compulsion can be
defined in terms of objective behavior—without regard to subjective
experience—or in economic or rational choice terms, definitions that have
theoretical, measurement, and esthetic advantages.52 Indeed, there is clear
49. AM. PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 45 (Narriman C. Shahrokh & Robert J. E. Hales eds., 8th ed.
2003) (emphasis added).
50. Attempts to measure the strength of compulsions have been conceptually confused or
methodologically suspect. See Stephen J. Morse, From ‘Sikora’ to ‘Hendricks’: Mental Disorder and
Criminal Responsibility, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 129, 160–63 (Lynda E. Frost &
Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2001).
51. See JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDITION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 166–69
(1999); Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 517–23 (rejecting
the “strong substance caused view” of addiction).
52. See generally GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL (2001) [hereinafter BREAKDOWN OF
WILL]; GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE

07__MORSE.DOC

182

9/8/2006 3:52 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:165

evidence that classical and operant conditioning best explain some addictive
phenomena, and some researchers believe that any definition including
subjective experiences such as craving will be circular. Nevertheless, a purely
objective definition will fail to consider the addict’s subjectivity, which most
investigators and informed observers believe is crucial to adequate
understanding.53 If craving is crucial to the definition, including it does not
threaten circularity because craving can exist in the absence of seeking and
using behavior. Finally, addiction could be defined in terms of tolerance and
withdrawal because these physiologically related states might be relatively
objectively measured. Indeed, these criteria are included in both DSM-IV-TR
and ICD-10, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient. Compulsive drug
seeking and using can exist without them, and they can exist without
accompanying compulsive activity and consequent harms.
In sum, present authoritative sources tell us, mostly conclusorily, that agents
are driven, that they feel strong or overpowering desires, that they have intense
cravings, and, least helpfully, that they are compelled. We are left where we
began—with a descriptive phenomenological account of the addict’s subjective
mental states and behavior and common-sense understanding of those mental
states and behavior.
Although the present understanding of craving and compulsion is often
vague and inferential, the terms do have common-sense content and they are
clearly both continuum concepts. Not all agents who experience craving and
compulsion experience these states with the same intensity. If craving and
compulsion may be predicates of an excuse for addiction-related action, it
seems to follow that the intensity of these states would be crucial to
responsibility assessment. But we do not have scientifically validated measures
for the intensity of craving and compulsion, and even the discovery of clear
biological (or other) causes for these states may not help in this regard. Craving
and compulsion are intentional mental states. They take objects; people crave a
specific thing or feel compelled to do a specific thing. A crucial feature about
such states is that agents have privileged first-person access to them. Unless
mental states are identical to and reducible to physical states—a highly
controversial position in the philosophy of mind54—identification of biological
causes will not indicate the subjective intensity of craving and compulsion. The
upshot is that analysis of the responsibility of addicts for addiction-related
behavior—however the addiction is caused—must at present rely on concepts

MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 96–273 (1992). But see Gideon Yaffe, Recent Work on
Addiction and Responsible Agency, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 178 (2001) (criticizing the usefulness of
rational choice and related models of addiction for thinking about individual responsibility).
53. See ELSTER, supra note 51, at 62–65.
54. See generally PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 7–49 (rev. ed. 1988)
(reviewing various approaches to understanding the mind-body problem). It is not known how the
brain produces the mind. Until the mind-body problem is “solved,” which will revolutionize our
understanding of biology, such questions will remain. PAUL R. MCHUGH & PHILIP R. SLAVNEY, THE
PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 11–12 (2d ed. 1998).
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about the mental states of intentional agents that can be best evaluated using
common sense.
B. Addiction and Individual Responsibility55
Once addicted, should addicts be responsible for use and further drugrelated activity? By definition, addicts—or anyway most of them—experience
subjective craving and compulsion to seek and use drugs. In some cases,
withdrawal also might be feared, but most addicts know that the physical
symptoms are manageable, and some of the “hardest” drugs addicts experience
no physical withdrawal or any withdrawal syndrome at all.56 Craving and
compulsion drive the addict. If compulsion and lack of the capacity for
rationality are the law’s primary excusing conditions,57 do craving and
compulsion to use addictive substances or to engage in other addiction-related
crimes provide a compulsion or rationality excuse?
1. The Internal Coercion Theory58
Although the biological models and the discovery of biological causes imply
that the addict’s symptomatic behaviors are mechanisms, this is simply not true.
Compulsive states are marked by allegedly overwhelming desires or cravings,
but whether the cravings are produced by faulty biology, including genetic
predispositions or defects, faulty psychology, faulty environment, or some
combination of the three, a desire is just a desire and its satisfaction by seeking
and using is human action. The addict desires, broadly, either the pleasure of
intoxication, the avoidance of the pain of withdrawal or inner tension, or both.

55. Much of the analysis in this part necessarily involves philosophical, abstract concepts. The
issue of responsibility is conceptual, moral, social, and political; it is not scientific, although scientifically
discovered data and theories can provide important inputs to moral, social, and legal thinking. See
generally Comm. on Addictions, supra note 21; Yaffe, supra note 52 (reviewing and analyzing empirical
and philosophical concepts). Two recent, edited collections concerning genetics and criminality are
excellent sources concerning genetics and responsibility, although neither is specifically focused on
addiction. See Dan W. Brock & Allen E. Buchanan, The Genetics of Behavior and Concepts of Free
Will and Determinism, in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC
INFORMATION IN COURT 67 (Jeffrey R. Botkin, William M. McMahon & Leslie Pickering Francis eds.,
1999) (see especially); GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit
eds., 2001). See supra Part II for highly sophisticated contributions concerning responsibility.
56. Withdrawal from cocaine, for example, produces dysphoric mood rather than the
uncomfortable physical symptoms that accompany opiate withdrawal. Margaret Haney, Neurobiology
of Stimulants, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT 31, 36–37 (Marc Glanter & Herbert D. Kleber eds., 3d ed. 2004). Some “hard” drugs,
such as PCP, have no withdrawal syndrome. Shelly F. Greenfield & Grace Hennessy, Assessment of the
Patient, in id. at 101, 112.
57. There is no uncontroversially correct descriptive model of the law’s responsibility doctrines and
practices. Some model must implicitly or explicitly be used to assess responsibility, however. I have
argued that the model being used is the best overall description of our law and is normatively desirable.
See infra Part IV; see also Morse, supra note 16; Morse, supra note 24. The general model may not
convince everyone concerning all details, but it is clearly a standard type of view and not idiosyncratic.
58. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV.
1025, 1054–63 (2002) (explaining the meaning of internal compulsions generally).
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The addict believes that using the substance will satisfy the desire and
consequently forms the intention to seek and to use the substance.
To attempt to demonstrate that people suffering from compulsive states are
similar to mechanisms, the following type of analogy is often used. Imagine that
a person is hanging by the fingernails from a cliff over a very deep chasm. The
hapless cliffhanger is strong enough to hold on for a while, but not strong
enough to save her life by pulling herself up. As time passes and gravity and
muscle physiology do their work, she inevitably weakens and it becomes harder
and harder to hang on. Finally it becomes impossible and the cliffhanger falls to
her death. We are asked to believe that the operation of compulsive desires or
cravings is like the combined effect of gravity and muscle physiology. At first
the hapless addict can perhaps resist, but inevitably she weakens and satisfies
the desire for drugs.
Brief reflection demonstrates that the analogy is flawed as an explanation of
why compulsive states are “just like” mechanisms. Unlike action to satisfy a
desire, the fall is a genuine mechanism. Holding on indefinitely is physically
impossible and the ultimate failure of strength is not intentional. Imagine the
following counterexample: A vicious gunslinger trails the addict closely and
threatens to kill her instantly if she seeks or uses drugs. Assuming that the
addict wants to live as much as the cliffhanger does, no addict would yield to the
desire.59 Conversely, even if the same gunslinger threatened to shoot the
cliffhanger immediately if she started to fall, she will fall every time. Of course,
our liberal society does not force or even permit addicts to employ such a selfmanagement technique, but the counterexample, like Leroy Powell’s case,60
indicates that the addict’s behavior is not a mechanism.
An addict is not a cliffhanger, of course, so let us consider some closer
analogies, such as a powerful, persistent itch, or an increasingly full bladder, or
the motor and verbal tics of those suffering from Tourette’s Disorder.61 It can
be damnably hard not to scratch an itch, even if it is contraindicated. An
increasingly full bladder can cause dreadful discomfort and an overwhelming
feeling of the need to void. The premonitory build up of tension that precedes

59. Addicts simply need sufficiently good reason not to yield. One might object that they only
need sufficiently good inducement, rather than good reason, but in this case the inducement is in fact a
good reason. Another possibility is that the variable motivating abstinence is not a good reason, but
simply one that is so salient that it creates motivational force. This is undoubtedly possible, but in most
cases of genuine addiction, what induces abstinence will almost certainly be a good reason, rather than
simply a salient rationale. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Professor of Philosophy, University of North
Carolina, provided helpful insight on these points.
60. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517–18 (1968) (suggesting that Powell was able to stop
drinking the day of his trial for public drunkenness because he knew that he had to be in court).
61. The itch example was given by George Ainslie, Chief of Psychiatry at the Coatesville,
Pennsylvania Veterans Administration Hospital. Dr. Ainslie is a leading theorist and researcher on
addictions. See generally AINSLIE, supra note 51. The bladder example was first suggested by an
anonymous participant at a conference. Jon Elster also uses it. On Tourette’s Disorder, see Charles W.
Popper, G. Davis Gammon, Scott A. West & Charles E. Bailey, Disorders Usually First Diagnosed in
Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence, in TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 833, 906–11 (Robert E.
Hales & Stuart C. Yudofsky eds., 4th ed. 2003).
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and is relieved by tic behavior among those suffering from Tourette’s is usually
intense and far more bothersome than the tics themselves. In all cases, the
“pressure” to satisfy the desire, to end the discomfort, can be immense. But
even in such cases the agent will be to some degree reward-sensitive or reasonresponsive. The gun at the head will work again. If people with itches, full
bladders, or pre-tic tension satisfy the desire to rid themselves of the itch,
discomfort, or tension, surely their behavior will be action and not mechanism.62
Still, although the addict’s behavior is not mechanism, perhaps not seeking
and using is as hard as not scratching an itch, voiding one’s bladder, or engaging
in tic behavior. Is it fair to expect the addict to self-regulate successfully in
ordinary circumstances that do not permit brute techniques, such as threatening
oneself with instant death, just in case one lapses? Is yielding to the desire an
appropriate basis for blame and punishment, especially in extreme cases?
Perhaps, after all, drug-related activity is sufficiently like mechanistic movement
to qualify for an excuse, but this requires an argument rather than an analogy.
Too often we are seduced by medical metaphors that strongly suggest
mechanism. Nevertheless, the disease model and ordinary language—the
addict allegedly “can’t help using,” or is “impelled to use,” or, more bluntly, is
“compelled to use”—suggest that addiction primarily produces a control or
volitional problem.
Volition is a vexing foundational problem for philosophy, psychology, and
law.63 Even if “black box” models of control problems seem to explain the
phenomena deemed addiction, the law’s concept of the person as a conscious,
intentional agent implies that such models cannot provide the law with
adequate guidance either to decide if an excuse is warranted either in general or
in individual cases. Any model must translate into terms of human agency.
Consider some alternatives. If one adopts Professor Michael Moore’s
influential, widely-noticed contention that volition is a functional mental state
of executory intention,64 the problem of volition disappears because virtually no
addict has a volitional problem. Their wills translate their desires for the drug
into the necessary action quite effectively. Indeed, on this account of the will,
almost no intentional conduct will raise a problem of volition.65 Moore’s
account is persuasive, but like all accounts of the philosophical foundations of
action, it is controversial. Some competitors that consider volition a species of
desire, a view that Moore and others reject,66 may raise volitional problems in

62. If a full bladder finally simply “overflows” because the pressure prevents the agent from
controlling the sphincter muscles, voiding is purely a mechanism.
63. See Bernard J. Baars, Why Volition is a Foundation Problem for Psychology, 2
CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 281 (1993); Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 25, at 1595–97.
64. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR CRIMINAL LAW 113–65 (1993).
65. Id.
66. E.g., GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 66–67 (1986) (citing Kant).
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the case of addicts.67 Unless these alternatives can be reduced to ordinary
language concepts that apply to human agency, however, it will be impossible
for legislatures and courts to resolve disputes about the metaphysics of mind
and action rationally.68
An “internal coercion” model is one possible explanation of a control or
volitional excuse based on “disorders of desire.”69 The model employs a
moralized, common-sense approach that is analogous to the criminal law excuse
of duress and that requires no implausible, unverifiable empirical assumptions
about how the mind works.70 Thinking about duress is fundamental to this
approach. Consequently, its criteria will be considered before turning to
whether the model can be applied to addictions.
Duress obtains if the defendant is threatened with the use of deadly force or
grievous bodily harm against himself or another unless the defendant commits
an equally or more serious crime, and a person of reasonable firmness would
have been “unable to resist” the threat.71 In other words, an agent faced with a
particularly “hard choice”—commit a crime or be killed or grievously injured—
is legally excused if the choice is too hard to expect the agent to buck up and
obey the law. The defense, however, is not based on empirical assumptions
about the subjective capacity of an individual agent to resist threats; it is
moralized and made objective.72 For example, the defense is not available to a
defendant allegedly “unable” to resist if the threats were less than death or
grievous bodily harm or if a person of reasonable firmness would have been
able to resist.
The moralized criterion of the person of reasonable firmness necessary to
support the excuse of duress appears to risk unfairness. Suppose a person
would find it extraordinarily difficult to resist threats that a person of

67. See, e.g., WILLIAM CHARLTON, WEAKNESS OF THE WILL: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION
(1988) (discussing competing accounts of weakness of the will); R. Jay Wallace, Addiction as Defect of
the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections, 18 L. & PHIL. 621 (1999) (see especially Section 2).
68. A classic, well-known example of a theory of volition that can be understood in ordinary
language terms and that has therefore received much attention in the legal as well as philosophical
literature is Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF
WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11, 24 (1988). For reasons considered elsewhere,
however, this seemingly attractive model does not succeed. See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra
note 25, at 1626–28.
69. The next subsection suggests that irrationality provides a better explanation of why we might
excuse or mitigate the responsibility of an agent suffering from a disorder of desire such as addiction.
70. The analysis in this subsection has been enormously influenced by Alan Wertheimer’s
treatment of similar issues. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). It is assumed that duress can
sometimes be an excusing condition. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the
Excuse and Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989). R. Jay Wallace believes
that it is always a justification. See WALLACE, supra note 6, at 144–47. The differences are discussed in
the text infra.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962).
72. Using the term “objective” is not meant to suggest that the “person of reasonable firmness”
criterion has a reality independent of our practices that can be discovered by reason or empirical
investigation. It is only meant to be a thoroughly normative standard that expresses what we all expect
of each other in our legal and moral culture.
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reasonable firmness could resist. Under such conditions, criminal penalties
would be retributively unjust because a person does not deserve punishment for
conduct that is so difficult for that agent to avoid. Moreover, specific
deterrence is bootless in such cases. A purely consequential view might justify
punishment to buck up the marginal people, but only at the cost of injustice to
those unable to resist. Because fault is a necessary condition for blame and
punishment in our system, denying the defense would be unjust. Those who
take this position should argue for a purely subjective view of the duress excuse,
which would require difficult empirical assessment of the defendant’s capacity
to resist. This standard would be a nightmare to adjudicate, but worth the
effort if it were necessary to avoid injustice.
There is a good argument, however, that the moralized, objective standard
that uses the person of reasonable firmness as the criterion is not unfair. If a
person is threatened with death, for example, the defense of duress should be
potentially available unless the balance of evils is so remarkably negative that
every person would be expected to resist. In all other cases, the question would
at least “go to the jury.” Thus, there will be few cases involving sufficiently
serious threats in which the person incapable of resisting would lose the
potential defense. The person genuinely incapable—if any there be—of
resisting even when the threats are relatively mild—say, kill or be touched—will
almost certainly be a person with irrational fears that will qualify for some type
of irrationality defense. Duress might not obtain, but exculpation will be
available on other grounds.
The formulation, “unable to resist,” has the unmistakable implication of
mechanism. Unless force majeure or genuine mechanism is at work, we
virtually never know whether the agent is in some sense genuinely unable or is
simply unwilling to resist, and if the latter, how hard it is for the agent to resist.
In the present state of knowledge, research evidence concerning the
characteristics that help people maintain control when faced with temptation or
experiencing impulses is no more than a general guide.73 No metric and no
instrumentation can accurately resolve questions about the strength of craving
and the ability to resist. This was in large part the reason that both the
American Psychiatric Association and the American Bar Association
recommended the abolition of the control or volitional test for legal insanity in
the wake of the ferment following the Hinckley74 verdict.75 Moreover, courts

73. ROY F. BAUMEISTER, TODD F. HEATHERTON & DIANNE M. TICE, LOSING CONTROL: HOW
WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 242–56 (1994) (considering self-regulation techniques
and distinguishing underregulation, in which the agent often actively participates, and misregulation, in
which the agent seldom actively participates). See generally BREAKDOWN OF WILL, supra note 52
(applying hyperbolic discounting theories to problems of willpower and loss of control); ALBERT
BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL (1997) (providing an overview of human
agency and presentation of “self-efficacy” theory); HOWARD RACHLIN, THE SCIENCE OF SELFCONTROL (2000) (providing a review of research and theoretical account of self-control based on
“teleological behaviorism”).
74. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C. 1981).
AND
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faced with deciding whether to adopt a volitional test after Hinkley refused to
do so for the same reason.76 If strength of craving or of resistance are to be the
touchstones, legal decisionmakers will have to act with little scientific guidance
and lots of common sense.77
The analogy often used to demonstrate that craving is like duress is that the
intense cravings or desires of “compulsive” states are like an “internal” gun to
the head. The sufferer’s fear of physical or psychological withdrawal symptoms
and of other dysphoric states78 is allegedly so great that it is analogous to the
“do-it-or-else” fear of death or grievous bodily injury that is necessary for a
duress defense. Yielding to a compulsive desire, a craving, is therefore like
yielding to a threat of death or grievous bodily harm.79 The argument is that we
cannot expect a person of reasonable firmness not to yield in the face of such an
internally generated hard choice, much as we cannot expect such a person not
to yield in the face of an external threat of death or grievous bodily harm.
The analogy is attractive, but theoretically and practically problematic.
First, the analogy suggests no problem with the defender’s will, which operates
effectively to execute the intention to block or to remove the dysphoria.80
Further, it is entirely rational, at least in the short-term, to wish to terminate
ghastly dysphoria, even if there are competing reasons not to, such as criminal
sanctions or moral degradation. And it is simply not the case that addicts
always act to satisfy their cravings because they fear dysphoria. Many just yield
because it is unpleasant to abstain, not because they substantially fear
dysphoria. In addition, the phenomenology of the sufferer’s response to
craving, unlike the phenomenology of the victim threatened by death, often is
not, and perhaps never is, clear or the product of unitary, simple causes.
Suppose, for example, that the primary motive is the pleasure or satisfaction of
yielding or that such pleasure is an important, additional motive. The

75. See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 330, 339–42 (1989); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, INSANITY DEFENSE:
POSITION STATEMENT (1982).
76. E.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). The Court also held that
narcotics addiction alone, without other physiological or psychological involvement, was not a mental
disease or defect for the purpose of raising the insanity defense. Id. Presumably, the court meant
physiological or psychological effects that were not per se part of the criteria for addiction. Congress
later abolished the volitional wing of the insanity defense in federal criminal trials and retained only a
cognitive test for legal insanity. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).
77. For example, one writer explains, “The strength of the craving may be gauged by how willing
the person is to sacrifice other sources of reward or well-being in life to continue engaging in the
addictive behavior.” Dennis M. Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors: Implications of an
Emerging Biopsychosocial Model, in ASSESSMENT OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 3, 6 (Dennis M.
Donovan & G. Alan Marlatt eds., 1988)[hereinafter Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors].
Although written by an estimable researcher, it is no more than an operationalized, common-sense
measure.
78. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2, at 663 (stating that most “impulse-control
disorders” include an increase of tension and arousal before committing the harmful act).
79. In most cases of “impulse-control disorders,” there is an experience of pleasure, satisfaction, or
relief after committing the impulsive act. Id.
80. FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 26, at 61.
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possibility of pleasure seems more like an offer than a threat, and offers expand
rather than contract freedom. The strong desire for pleasure is not a hardchoice excusing condition in law or morals.
Assuming that fear of dysphoria is a sufficient motive and that the analogy
to the fear of death or grievous bodily harm is initially plausible, two problems
remain: assessing the strength of the fear and deciding what degree of fear of
dysphoria is sufficient to excuse what types of conduct. Based on ordinary
experience and common sense, the criminal law uses threats of death or
grievous bodily harms as objective indicators of the type of stimulus that would
in ordinary people create sufficient hard choice to justify an excuse. Of course,
people subjected to such threats will differ markedly in their subjective fear
responses and in their desires to live or to remain uninjured, but ordinary,
average people will have very substantial fear and find the choice to resist very
We have all experienced dysphoric states, and many have
difficult.81
experienced intense dysphoria, but dysphoria as a source of present and
potential pain is more purely subjective than death or grievous bodily injury.
Consequently, assessing the average or ordinary intensity of craving or inner
tension, including seemingly strong states, is simply more difficult than assessing
the fear of death or grievous bodily injury. Focusing on more objective markers
of compulsive states, such as physical withdrawal symptoms, will surely help,
but fear of such symptoms is unlikely to support an excuse.
Fear of the physical symptoms of withdrawal from most drugs is not likely to
be as intense as the fear of death or grievous bodily harm because in most cases
withdrawal is not terribly painful—withdrawal from heroin is often likened to a
bad flu—and can be medically managed to reduce the discomfort.82 Withdrawal
from alcohol dependence can be extremely severe, but it, too, can be medically
managed, and because alcohol is freely and inexpensively available for adults,
those who fear withdrawal and do not want treatment seldom need to commit
crimes or other wrongs to obtain alcohol to avoid withdrawal.
Dysphoric mental or emotional states are surely undesirable, but does their
threat, especially if medical management is available, produce a sufficiently
hard choice to warrant an excuse? The answer to this question is not obvious,
but perhaps at the extreme they do. People suffering from severe depressive
disorders, for example, report subjective pain that is apparently as great and
enduring as the reported pain from many forms of grievous bodily harm, and
sometimes depressed people kill themselves to avoid the psychological pain.
For another example, some people addicted to alcohol who are being treated
with a drug that makes them dreadfully sick if they ingest any alcohol, including

81. The analysis could apply to moral dilemmas that the criminal law does not address. Imagine a
person who possesses a monetarily worthless locket that contains an equally financially worthless but
emotionally priceless memento, say, a strand of a sainted parent’s hair. One could easily imagine that a
threat to destroy the locket might morally excuse quite serious property crime and perhaps crimes
against the person, although the criminal law would recognize no excuse in this case.
82. See JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 35–36 (1983).
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trace amounts, will “drink through” the miserable sickness.83 These examples
and common sense suggest that fear of or aversiveness to psychologically
dysphoric states may be very strong, indeed.84 But is it as strong as the fear of
death?
Even assuming that the feared dysphoria of unconsummated cravings can be
substantial, it will likely seldom be as severe as the fear of death or grievous
bodily harm. If this is right and assuming, too, that we could reliably assess the
fear of dysphoria, few addicts would succeed with a hard-choice excuse. On the
other hand, if the drug-related activities were simple possession for personal use
and use itself, then perhaps the justification of necessity should obtain.85 Even if
the harm of such activity is less than the harm of dysphoria, however, the law
would hold most addicts responsible for becoming addicted and thus for placing
themselves in the situation that created the need for the defense. The law
disallows the justification in such cases.86 Finally, even if addicts were not
responsible for becoming addicted, all legislatures would today resist permitting
a justification for possession and use on policy grounds and would surely reject
an excuse for other, possibly related crimes, such as theft or robbery, to pay for
drugs. The disease model is powerful, but the moral failure model is resilient.
In sum, the internal coercion or duress approach uses understandable terms
and has a moral basis derived from a defense that the criminal law and ordinary
morality already accept. Nevertheless, currently insurmountable practical
problems beset attempting to assess the appropriateness of an excuse in
individual cases. What is more, thinking about excuse in terms of control
difficulties inevitably will invite misleading metaphorical thinking about
mechanism and expert testimony that is little more than moral judgment
wrapped in the white coat of allegedly scientific or clinical understanding. The
law should not adopt an internal coercion excuse.
2. The Irrationality Theory
Irrationality is the most straightforward, persuasive explanation of why
some addicts should perhaps be excused. Moreover, irrationality will excuse
any addict who may apparently qualify under the internal coercion theory. If
the craving sufficiently interferes with the addict’s ability to grasp and be guided
by reason, then a classic irrationality problem arises and there is no need to
resort to compulsion as the ground for excuse. Finally, it is simply more
83. ARNOLD M. LUDWIG, UNDERSTANDING THE ALCOHOLIC’S MIND: THE NATURE OF
CRAVING AND HOW TO CONTROL IT 58–59 (1988). Such cases are surely rare, however, and most
alcoholics who wish to drink either discontinue their aversive therapy or find ways to disable its effect.
Interestingly, some East Asian populations have a genetically caused variation in the enzymes that
metabolize alcohol that create effects of ingestion similar to the effects of the aversive therapy
medication. Alcohol addiction is consequently infrequent in such populations. Nestler, supra note 3, at
277.
84. See Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors, supra note 77.
85. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962).
86. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2003) (allowing the defense as an emergency
measure to avoid an imminent harm if the situation occurred “through no fault of the actor”).
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practicable to assess rationality than to assess the strength of compulsive
desires.
How does it feel to crave intensely? The subjective experience of addicts is
diverse, but a modal tale may be useful. Despite different historical pathways
to addiction, descriptions of the subjective experience are broadly of a piece,87
although different descriptors and metaphors are and could be used. The story
is not meant to include all the features of the addictive process; rather, it is an
approximation of the subjective experience preceding use that may bear on
responsibility.
Between episodes of use of the substance, the addict commonly experiences
a build up of tension, irritation, anxiety, boredom, depression, or other
dysphoric states. As time passes since the last use, these dysphoric states
typically become stronger, more persistent, more intense, and more demanding.
In some cases, the build-up is described as sheer desire, sheer wanting. As the
wanting remains unsatisfied, increased dysphoric states or, in some cases,
excitement, accompany the wanting. For illicit-drug addicts, anxiety or fear
about obtaining the substance often adds to the dysphoria.
At some point, the addict metaphorically, and in some cases literally, can
think of nothing but the desire to use the substance. One informant described
the desire like “a buzzing in my ears that prevents me from focusing.” It is like
an extreme version of being dehydrated or starved: the addict can ordinarily
think of nothing except getting and using the stuff. It is like the moment just
before orgasm during an episode of exceptional excitement, but usually without
the pleasurable feeling of sexual excitement. There is only one tune or story in
the addict’s head and nothing else drives it out.88 When the addict can not get
the tune out of his head, it is very difficult to concentrate the mind on the good
reasons not to use, especially because, in almost all instances, there is no police
officer at the elbow or other available “self-management technique” sufficiently
powerful to motivate the addict to think clearly about drug-related activity.
Fundamental components of rationality—the capacities to think clearly and
self-consciously to evaluate one’s conduct—are compromised. The agent may
not recognize the various options at all or may not be able coherently to weigh
and assess those that are recognized. For moral and legal purposes, however,
the precise mechanisms by which addiction can compromise rationality are less
important than the clear evidence that it can do so.89 On the other hand, the
87. See, e.g., Donovan, Assessment of Addictive Behaviors, supra note 77, at 5–11 (describing
“commonalities across addictive behaviors”).
88. See, e.g., Michael B. Ross, It’s Time for Me to Die: An Inside Look at Death Row, 26 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 475, 482–83 (1998) (providing a first person account given by a death row inmate
with persistent, allegedly overwhelming urges to degrade, rape, and kill, who describes the urges as a
song one cannot get out of one’s head). This example does not involve addictions, of course, but
certain disorders of sexual desire, the paraphilias, produce impulse control problems similar to those
associated with substance-related problems and impulse control disorders generally.
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., supra note 2, at 663.
89. See ELSTER, supra note 51, at 169–79 (reviewing the potential mechanisms through which
cravings resulting from drug addiction can affect rational choice); Peter W. Kalivas, Choose to Study
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addict’s characteristic ambivalence about addiction suggests that addicts
recognize that they have good reason to stop, at least during lucid or inter-use
intervals.90
The degree to which the general capacity for rationality is compromised can
vary widely among addicts. The modal tale is told as an extreme case and is
anyway only an approximation. Still, addiction can compromise rationality and
therefore can potentially excuse drug-related activity, especially for those most
severely affected. Thus, the question remains whether the law should consider
addiction as a potential excuse. This is an important question for social and
legal policy because drugs are a factor in much criminal conduct. Possession
and use offenses are rampant, and in most big cities, well over half of all people
arrested for felonies test positive for addictive substances.91 Many of these are
surely addicts. Society may believe that it is fair to blame and punish them, but
is it?
Thus far, the assumption has been made that addicts are not responsible for
becoming addicted. At this point, this assumption will be relaxed and it will be
assumed instead that many were responsible because prior to addiction they
retained general normative capacity and because they knowingly, albeit with
imperfect information, placed themselves at risk for becoming addicted.
Moreover, some people may become addicted intentionally. Of course, because
the majority of users of any substance do not become addicts, when future
addicts use substances prior to addiction, virtually none is certain to become
addicted. At most, they are consciously aware of the risk,92 especially if they are
aware of being in a high-risk group, but conscious awareness of substantial risk
is sufficient to support ascriptions of responsibility. At the very least, an addict
becomes addicted negligently. Some addicts are not at all responsible for their
condition because they genuinely became addicted before late adolescence,

Choice in Addiction, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 193 (2004) (stating that at some point in a developing
addiction disorder, decisionmaking ability becomes compromised); Louk J.M.J. Vanderschuren &
Barry J. Everitt, Drug Seeking Becomes Compulsive After Prolonged Cocaine Self-Administration, 305
SCIENCE 1017, 1017 (2004) (“Addicts display drug-dominated, inflexible behavior and are unable to
shift their thoughts and behavior away from drugs and drug-related activities,” which increases with
prolonged use).
90. This point is courtesy of George Ainslie, Chief of Psychiatry at the Coatesville, Pennsylvania
Veterans Administration Hospital.
91. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2002, 10, 11 (2003) (finding that 20.4% of sentenced state inmates in 2001 incarcerated for drug
offenses; 55% of sentenced federal inmates incarcerated for drug offenses); ZHANG, supra note 2; see
also DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG USE, TESTING, AND
TREATMENT IN JAILS 1 (2000) (finding that in 1998, 70% of jail inmates had used drugs regularly or
had committed a drug offense).
92. This language tracks the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessness, which is defined as
conscious awareness that one’s conduct is producing a substantial and unjustifiable risk of some harm.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962). In the case of licit substances, such as alcohol and nicotine,
the risk may not be legally unjustified, however, because using and being addicted to these substances
are not unlawful.
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because they were involuntarily addicted, or for some other responsibilitydiminishing reason. Such addicts are a minority, however.93
Whether or not addicts were responsible for becoming addicted, they will
not lack mens rea for their substance-related criminal activity.94 Virtually all
potential addicts are consciously aware of the risk that if addicted they will
persistently and intentionally seek and use substances. Nevertheless, the
previous conscious awareness of this risk is distinguishable from forming the
intention pre-addiction to seek and use after becoming addicted. For most
addicts, however, there will be no mens rea problem when they seek and use.
They are not automatons and they do form the intent to buy, possess, and use.
In most cases of serious criminal wrongdoing, the potential addict may be
unaware of the risk of committing such offenses unless the addict has a history
of such wrongdoing. Even if this is true, however, there still will be no mens rea
problem. An addict who burgles, robs, or kills surely forms the intent to do so.
In the narrow legal sense, most addicts have the true purpose to engage in their
drug-related conduct. If they deserve mitigation and excuse, it is because they
are not fully rational, not because they lack the mental state required by the
definition of the offense.
As a result of addiction, some addicts are sufficiently irrational to warrant
mitigation or excuse at the time they commit their substance-related crimes.
Should they be held responsible nonetheless? Two theories suggest in general
that virtually all should be. The first is that by experimenting, the addict
knowingly took the risk that she would become irrational, including the
possibility that the irrationality would operate specifically in contexts involving
substance-related behavior. The second and more convincing theory is that
almost all addicts have lucid, rational intervals between episodes of use during
which they could act on the good reasons to seek help quitting or otherwise to
take steps to avoid engaging in harmful drug-related behavior. This situation
has been termed a case of potential diachronic self-control because the person
knows that at a later time she will be in a state of non-responsible irrationality.95
Again, the ambivalence about addiction that characterizes addicts implies that
they are capable of and do recognize these good reasons during their lucid
intervals. Even if some addicts are unable to think rationally when they are in a

93. Assuming that addicts are responsible for their condition, an interesting question is whether
addiction is just a status, as Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), held, or whether it necessarily
includes seeking and using behavior, as the definition considered above requires. Because the law is
unconcerned with status per se, the criminality or immorality of simply being an addict will not be
addressed.
94. The major exception will be cases in which the addict offends while in a state of
unconsciousness or blackout induced by substance use. Most jurisdictions would permit only limited
use of such evidence to negate mens rea and some would not permit it at all. The Supreme Court has
declared constitutional the total exclusion of intoxication evidence, even when it is undeniably relevant
and probative of culpability. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
95. JEANNETTE KENNETT, AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY: A COMMON-SENSE MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 134–35 (2001).
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state of intense craving, they are capable of rationality in refractory periods and
have a duty to take steps to avoid future offending.
Both theories are potentially subject to the same objection, however.
Addiction can become an entire lifestyle and the consequences of prolonged
use of substances can so debilitate addicts physically and psychosocially that
some addicts have exceptional difficulty at all times exercising substantial
rationality concerning their status and behavior. Although potential addicts
may be aware of the risk of irrationality, they may not be fully aware of the risk
of extreme irrationality that can arise in some cases. In such cases, perhaps, one
cannot find responsibility for extreme irrationality by referring back to preaddiction, knowing conduct, or by considering quiescent intervals. In cases of
extreme debilitation, the intervals between episodes of use may not be fully
rational.
The foregoing objection does not seem decisive, however. First, in those
few cases in which prolonged drug use produces a permanent, major mental
disorder that compromises rationality at the time of criminal conduct, the addict
will have available a traditional insanity defense based on “settled insanity”
resulting from the use of intoxicants.96 But except in such rare cases, most
addicts’ rational intervals are probably sufficiently rational to hold them largely
or fully responsible for diminishing their own rationality at the time of use or
other drug-related crimes. In addition, as a result of both street wisdom and
personal history, experienced addicts typically know during these intervals both
what treatment alternatives are available and the type of criminal behavior
beyond seeking and using in which they are likely to engage. Indeed, much of
the further criminal activity probably takes place during the rational intervals
and involves harm to others, which carries greater criminal penalties, giving the
addict even stronger self- and other-regarding reasons not to offend than in the
case of personal possession and use.
Finally, suppose one concludes that some addicts deserve mitigation or
excuse for at least some criminal conduct. The previous subsection on the
internal coercion theory suggests that irrationality would excuse any addict that
the internal coercion theory might fairly excuse. The argument, in brief, is this:
A person driven crazy by fear is crazy. Or, in the alternative, people so fearful
of mild dysphoric states that they appear incapable of bucking up when
reasonable people would are irrationally fearful. Any plausible story about
allegedly compulsive cravings motivating the criminal conduct, especially in
cases of serious crime, also will be a story in which the addict is less than fully
rational or not rational at all. In such cases, irrationality would be the
appropriate excusing claim; there would be no need to resort to problematic
internal coercion.

96. It is assumed that almost all jurisdictions would permit this defense for cases in which the
settled insanity resulted from illicit drugs. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 481–82 (4th ed.
2003).
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The conclusion is that most addicts are responsible for seeking and using
and almost none should be excused for further criminal activity, and especially
not for serious wrongdoing. There are simply too many periods of rationality
and there is simply too much awareness of alternative possibilities to permit
excuse in more than a small number of cases.97
C. “Social Responsibility”
Socioeconomic arrangements, culture, life stories, legal regulation, and
other “external” causal variables can seem much to blame for addiction and its
consequences. Even if most addicts are responsible for becoming addicted and
for their behavior while addicted, whether one becomes an addict and how one
lives as an addict are not solely due to the intentional conduct of an agent who
becomes an addict.
Consider the following examples. It is entirely understandable that people
living in communities of deprivation, with few life chances, may find a life of
addiction preferable to the misery of an impoverished straight life. Some
subcultures particularly encourage and celebrate the use of potentially addictive
substances, increasing the risk of addiction among members of that subculture.
For those who have lived lives of desperation or who suffer from psychological
miseries for any reason, substance use can be a welcome escape. Finally, legal
regulation can affect the probability of addiction, the lifestyles of addicts, and
the further behavioral consequences of addiction. It is more difficult to bum a
dime bag than to bum a smoke or to cadge a free drink, even from friends, and
the addict can never be sure that a dealer is not an undercover narc, an
informant, or cutting the dope. Lawful availability and price affect rates of
consumption, the development of informal customs and conventions for
controlled use, the health, safety, and legal dangers of seeking and using drugs,
and the probability that other criminal behavior beyond possession and use will
occur as a result of addiction. Explanations such as these, especially when
considered in the context of a sympathy-arousing life history, can tug at our
hearts and influence our responsibility attributions. As Gary Watson concluded
in his discussion of the case of a murderer who had suffered a dreadful
childhood, in many cases our reaction will be, “No wonder.”98
How should we respond to powerful social explanations? Social variables
account undeniably for a great deal of the variance in addictions and related

97. Part IX.A infra considers the case for mitigation in more detail. This part also suggests that
current criminal law overcriminalizes much drug-related activity. Even if addicts might be responsible
for that activity, it does not follow that it is sensible to criminalize it.
98. Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 256, 275
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). Watson’s description is of the life of Robert Alton Harris, a
notorious multiple murderer who seemed to have no empathy for other people. Indeed, his cellblock
mates on death row detested him. Yet if one reads his life history, it is difficult not to have at least a
modicum of sympathy for Harris and to think that a dreadful outcome was entirely understandable for
reasons in no way Harris’ fault. Id.
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behavior, and many of these variables are potentially modifiable by sound
social policy. For example, millions of lives will be affected by resolution of the
current debates concerning decriminalization of illicit drugs,99 differential
penalties for essentially similar substances such as crack and powdered cocaine,
the propriety of needle exchanges, and whether nicotine should be regulated by
the Food and Drug Administration. A just society should try to minimize the
inevitable ill effects of its policies. Nonetheless, crimes and moral wrongs are
ultimately committed by individual agents, and social causal variables, or any
other kind of causal variables, cannot excuse addicts who are individually
responsible without threatening all individual responsibility.100
All behavior is caused by innumerable variables over which we have no
control. Some causal stories surely arouse more sympathy than others, but
sympathy and an unfortunate life history are not excusing conditions per se.
One may wish to consider such variables for disposition on consequential
grounds or as an expression of mercy, but they do not excuse unless they
produce sufficient irrationality or a sufficiently hard choice. Focusing on
individual responsibility should not blind us to the remediable causes of
wrongdoing and should not diminish justifiable sympathy for wrongdoers, but
neither should explanations and sympathy undermine our view that most
wrongdoers are responsible agents.
IX
PROPOSALS: DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY,
DRUG TREATMENT, & SENSIBLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Three potential legal reforms might produce more proportionate blame and
punishment for addiction-related offenses and might reduce addictionassociated costs overall. First, the criminal law should adopt a generic partial
excuse to crime that might well apply to cases of addiction-related crime.
Second, forced treatment of addicts using the leverage of the criminal law
would be fair and likely to be effective. Last, sensible criminalization policy in
response to addiction and addiction-related crime would have profound effects.
A. Diminished Responsibility
Some addicts might not be responsible for seeking and use or for further
drug-related or drug-affected activity because they are not rational or not fully
rational, or perhaps, because they faced a sufficiently hard choice. This would
certainly be true if morality and the law held a less demanding set of criteria for
responsibility than now obtains. How could the law respond to such claims?

99. See infra Part IX.
100. See Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE TO SOCIAL
JUSTICE 114 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (considering and rejecting the various
theories proposed to excuse criminal behavior solely on the basis of an unfortunate life history).
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According to almost any definition, rationality and hard choice are
continuum concepts.101 Consequently, responsibility must be a matter of infinite
variation. But even if rationality is easier to assess than irresistibility, it is
beyond human ability to measure it precisely enough to ascribe infinite degrees
of responsibility. As a result, the law adopts bright-line tests, such as legal
insanity, and does not include a generic partial responsibility doctrine.102 The
law should consider a limited, generic partial excuse of “partial
responsibility.”103 Although there are practical objections that might fairly be
raised, the moral claim for a partial excuse is sufficiently weighty to justify
bearing the potential practical costs.
As the extant, mitigating doctrines of homicide imply, some legally
responsible defendants suffer from impaired rationality that warrants mitigation
and triers of fact can fairly make the relatively gross culpability judgment
required. The underlying theory of excuse that supports these doctrines—
impaired capacity for rationality—and the doctrines themselves are perfectly
generalizable to all crimes. There is no reason that juries could not reasonably
make the same judgments about mitigation for other crimes that they routinely
make to determine if murder should be reduced to manslaughter.
Justice would be better served if the criminal law adopted a generic partial
excuse, reflected in another possible verdict, “Guilty but Partially Responsible”
(GPR). Many crimes are committed when the defendant’s rationality may be
substantially impaired by a wide variety of factors, including the cognitive and
affective changes that addiction may produce. Fairness may demand mitigation
in such cases, but except within homicide or at sentencing, the criminal law has
no means to do justice, and the existing means suffer from various deficiencies.
A verdict such as GPR would provide a remedy. Because GPR would be a
partial affirmative defense, the Constitution would permit the state to place the
burden of persuasion on either the prosecution or the defense.104
Any formula that expressed the central mitigating notion would work as
long as it addressed the underlying, normative excusing condition, used

101. For ease of exposition, only rationality will be discussed. The argument applies equally well,
however, to an internal coercion or a so-called volitional theory of excuse.
102. The major exceptions are the mitigating doctrines of homicide that reduce murder to
manslaughter and sentencing practices generally.
103. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 289 (2003) (providing a full defense of a proposal for a generic partial excuse to crime and
considering the practical objections).
104. See Patterson v. New York, 423 U.S. 197 (1977). It is important to distinguish GPR from
“Guilty But Mentally Ill” (GBMI), a verdict adopted by a substantial minority of the states. GBMI
reflects a jury finding that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime, but that the
defendant was nonetheless fully responsible for her conduct. A GBMI defendant receives no necessary
reduction in sentence—indeed, in some jurisdictions capital punishment may be imposed—nor does it
guarantee treatment for the defendant that otherwise would not have been available. Thus, unlike
GPR, it is not a mitigating (or excusing) “defense.” Indeed, it is not a defense at all. In my opinion,
GBMI is a useless, confusing alternative that impermissibly allows juries to avoid finding a defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity in cases in which legal insanity appears justified. GBMI is like “Guilty
But Hepatitis.”
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common-sense terms, and was not tied to any limiting model of why a
defendant suffered from the requisite disturbance. As studies of the insanity
defense have shown, the words of the test are not crucial.105 Juries just need
some formulation roughly to guide their normative judgment.
Sentencing partially responsible defendants is a critical issue. Although
such defendants may be less culpable, in many cases the defendant’s impaired
rationality may present a continuing, substantial danger. Ex-addicts often
relapse and return to addictive lifestyles that may involve related, dangerous
criminal conduct, especially if they return to the setting in which the addictive
activity previously occurred. Unless a purely retributivist theory governs
punishment—in which case, punishment must be strictly proportional only to
desert—a sensible, legislatively mandated sentencing scheme must try to
balance culpability and public safety interests. The legislature should set a fixed
reduction in sentence for GPR. But however the reduction is characterized,
applying it would be no different in principle from the penalty reduction from
murder to manslaughter or from the sentence reduction for mitigation that a
judge might order. Moreover, if the reduction were legislatively mandated, and
assuming the continued importance of plea bargaining, its application would be
more consistent than if it were left to pure judicial discretion. Again, any
reasonable scheme would do.
This proposal would lump together defendants of disparately impaired
rationality, and consequently, different responsibility. This may seem to be a
denial of equal justice, but it results inevitably from the epistemological
difficulties confronting more fine-grained assessments. To permit many degrees
of partial excuse and corresponding degrees of punishment reduction would
require juries and judges to make judgments with a precision beyond the
capacity of both our moral theories and our ability to understand the necessary
facts. Confusion and arbitrary decisions, rather than more justice, would follow
from attempts at greater exactitude. If GPR were adopted, defendants in
general would have the potential to obtain just mitigation that is not currently
available for most. The failure to provide perfect justice in this imperfect world
is not a decisive, or even a weighty objection in this instance.
In sum, GPR might be the fairest way to respond to the diminished
rationality claims that some addicts and others present as a partial excuse to
crime. If adopted, the law might have more flexibility in responding than under
the current all-or-none approach, whereby few addicts could claim complete
non-responsibility. Nothing in this scheme would prevent the law from also

105. RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 125–27 (1988) (demonstrating on the basis of
vignette methodology that the insanity defense test used made little difference in jury verdicts); HENRY
J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 8,
45–62 (1993) (demonstrating using California data that the test for legal insanity made little difference
in operation of the insanity defense and jury verdicts).
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offering voluntary treatment, and, perhaps, from imposing treatment on
addicted and partially excused criminals.
B. Drug Treatment
Successful treatment of addictive states would immensely reduce the
personal and social costs of addiction. But, alas, highly effective and safe
treatments are not yet generally available for most substances. The new
biology, including increased understanding of genetics, has not yet led to major
discoveries of successful biological interventions.106 Given the complex genetic
basis for addiction, a simple gene therapy does not seem to be an imminently
foreseeable possibility. Other drugs, such as methadone or naltrexone, may
help some addicts kick some addictions, but no one claims that these drugs cure
the underlying pathophysiology or anatomical pathology. That is, to the best of
my knowledge, there is no evidence yet that these treatments reverse or
ameliorate the brain changes that prolonged use allegedly produces. Better
understanding of the biological mechanisms of addiction has not produced
magic bullets. Even abstinence for long periods of time, with or without
treatment, does not guarantee that compulsive seeking and use will not recur.
If the brain disease model is right, prolonged use changes brain structure and
function, but prolonged abstinence following addiction does not make the brain
normal again, or at least, not normal enough. Although the brain is famously
resilient, the brain disease model implies that prolonged drug use is an
apparently exceptional insult that changes the brain permanently for the worse.
Despite the basic biological advances, the most successful general treatment
strategies to date have been behavioral and social, including the quasi- (and
not-so-quasi-) religious regimens associated with Alcoholics Anonymous and
the like.107
Indeed, self-efficacy is the crucial variable in preventing

106. See, e.g., TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 56, at Part III, Treatment
for Specific Drugs of Abuse. This authoritative text has chapters on the treatment of all specific drugs
of abuse. Successful biological treatments are rare and virtually never are sufficient by themselves. But
see COMM. TO IDENTIFY STRATEGIES TO RAISE THE PROFILE OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM RESEARCH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DISPELLING THE MYTHS ABOUT ADDICTION:
STRATEGIES TO INCREASE UNDERSTANDING AND STRENGTHEN RESEARCH 73–87(1997) (stating a
more optimistic view based on recent research, but still admitting limited effectiveness and substantial
knowledge gaps). Charles P. O’Brien is considerably more optimistic about the possibility of using
naltrexone in a long-acting depot form to treat opioid addiction. Letter from Charles P. O’Brien, M.D.,
Ph.D., Department of Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania to Stephen J. Morse (Sept. 17, 2003) (on
file with the author); see also James W. Cornish, David Metzger, George Woody, David Wilson, A.
Thomas McLellan, Barry Vandergrift & Charles P. O’Brien, Naltrexone Pharmacotherapy for Opioid
Dependent Federal Probationers, 14 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 529 (1997) (reporting a
successful naltrexone treatment program in a small and non-random sample of federal probationers);
see generally Charles P. O’Brien, Anticraving Medications for Relapse Prevention: A Possible New Class
of Psychoactive Medications 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1423 (2005) (reviewing anticraving treatments);
Frank J. Vocci, Jane Acri & Ahmed Elkashef, Medication Development for Addictive Disorders: The
State of the Science 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1432 (2005) (reviewing the development of
pharmacotherapies for several substance abuse disorders).
107. See, e.g., TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 56, at 151–321 (detailing
treatments for specific drugs); David Ball, Genetic approaches to alcohol dependence, 185 BRIT. J.
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relapse.108 Those committed to the primarily biological model do not deny the
importance of behavioral variables and of social context and cues. Keeping the
addict away from the setting in which use typically occurs is powerfully
prophylactic, for example. Nonetheless, these methods too have limited
efficacy.
We should be modest about treatment efficacy, but treatment can be
helpful, and, reasonably presumably, increasingly effective biological and
psychosocial treatment methods for addictions will become available. For
example, biomedical research might develop an opioid antagonist that is safer
and more easily administered than naltrexone. Should such treatments be
offered voluntarily to addicts within the control of the criminal justice system
(and to addicts not under such control) and may it be imposed on addicts who
will not consent to treatment?
Assuming that resources to treat addicts are available without diminishing
resources for other, more worthy goals, social justice plausibly requires that
society try to help people who suffer from conditions that debilitate their own
lives and are costly to the lives of others, especially if such people are
imprisoned and thus entirely under the state’s control.109 Moreover, substances
play such a large role in criminal behavior that it simply makes good sense to try
to reduce the costs of drug- and addiction-related crime through treatment.
The more difficult question is whether the state may impose treatment,
either forcibly or by coercive practices. The Supreme Court has held that
prisoners have a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted psychotropic drug
treatment, but that the state may override that interest and treat prisoners
involuntarily if treatment is medically warranted and necessary to insure the
safety of the inmate or others in the institution.110 Probably few addicts in prison
would qualify for involuntary treatment based on substance disorder alone,111
but could the state offer better conditions in prison or shorter prison terms to
induce addicted prisoners to enter drug treatment programs? Could prisoners
give informed consent to such treatment? Would such conditions violate ethical
or constitutional prohibitions because they were too coercive and would
coercive programs be effective even if they were ethically and legally
acceptable? Many believe that such conditions are implicitly and unacceptably
coercive and that informed consent is impossible in such circumstances.
Therefore, unless the state has a sufficiently strong interest to override the
PSYCHIATRY 449, 450 (2004) (“Psychiatric genetics has yet to deliver on its early promise and it has not
yielded any major advance in the management of people who are alcohol-dependent.”).
108. C. Robert Cloninger, Genetics of Substance Abuse, in TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT, supra note 56, at 73, 78–79.
109. This point is weakly stated as only a “plausible claim,” even though it is my belief, because
what social justice demands is notoriously controversial. Many might deny the premise about resources
or claim that prisoners have the least strong claim in our society to limited social resources. For such
people, only consequential arguments might be persuasive.
110. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
111. Many addicts, of course, suffer from co-morbidities, and it is possible that such treatment might
be permissible based on non-addiction disorders.
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prisoner’s liberty interest in avoiding unwanted treatment, such treatment
cannot be employed.
Coercion is a notoriously fraught concept. The most common account
distinguishes between offers, which are thought to increase freedom and are
thus not coercive, and threats, which decrease freedom and are potentially
coercive. 112 The problem is to distinguish the two, which is difficult to do except
against a political and moral baseline that will itself be contestable. For
example, assume that a person is lying injured and helpless by the side of the
road. A physician arrives, identifies herself as a doctor, and asks if she can be of
assistance. The injured person asks the doctor to help. The doctor responds
that she will do so for a fee. If physicians have a duty in that society to help in
such circumstances without a fee, then the response is a threat; if physicians
have no such duty, then the response is an offer. Many cases cannot be so
neatly distinguished, however, and whether physicians should have to offer
services without a fee in such case is a controversial moral and political
question. Assuming that the baseline can be justified and the case can be
identified as a threat, another difficult question is how serious the threat must
be to be deemed unacceptably coercive. For example, assume that everyone
has a right not to be touched without consent. Suppose a malefactor says that
she will touch you without your permission unless you kill an innocent
bystander. The case is clearly one of threat, but the situation would be
insufficiently coercive to satisfy the criteria for duress that might excuse a
threatened agent who does wrong in response. The criterion of “sufficient
threat,” although standard, is contestable and under-determinative.
Nonetheless, it can help clarify the coerciveness of drug treatment programs.
In McKune v. Lile, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the
conditions accompanying a prison treatment program for sex offenders were
coercive and unconstitutional.113 The treatment program was voluntary, but it
required all participants to confess without immunity to any prior uncharged
sex offenses that they may have committed. Although no participant had ever
been subsequently charged for an uncharged but confessed offense, it was a
theoretical possibility. If a sex offender refused to participate, he was subject to
much harsher prison conditions than those who did participate. The Supreme
Court held that the program did not violate the prisoner’s Fifth Amendment
rights and was not coercive.114 Although the Court rejected a threat/offer mode
of analysis, the holding was based on the argument that the state had a right to
impose the harsher conditions in the absence of a treatment program, so the
situation was not coercive. Thus, it appears that the best explanation for the
Court’s holding is that the program was an offer, not a threat.

112. Wertheimer offers a particularly complete account of the various legal and philosophical
approaches in addition to his own theory. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 70.
113. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
114. Id.
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By analogy to McKune, it seems that the state can to some undetermined
extent use the leverage of the criminal justice system to induce an otherwise
unwilling prisoner to enter a treatment program. Indeed, the acceptance of
much current mental health treatment is motivated by various forms of leverage
used by the state’s agents.115 And there is no clear evidence that arguably or
undeniably coercive treatment is ineffective.116 Given the costs that addicts
impose on our society, there will be strong pressure to find various inducements
morally and constitutionally acceptable, especially if the treatments available
are efficacious at reasonable cost in reducing drug-related criminal behavior.
C. Sensible Criminalization Policy
According to the dominant legal model of the person, the criminal law
operates by providing rules and consequences for violating the rules that give
potential miscreants good reasons not to offend. The model assumes that the
creatures to whom these reasons are addressed are generally capable of using
them as premises in practical reasoning that should in most cases lead to the
conclusion that the agent should not violate the law. Of course, society is
delighted if other forms of social control, such as internalized conscience and
informal sanctions, also tend to limit criminal conduct.
The question for the law is whether and to what degree we should
criminalize drug-related offenses committed by addicts and non-addicts. No
sensible person thinks that the criminal law is sufficient to reduce the level of
criminalized harms to acceptable levels in a world of morally imperfect beings
who inhabit a non-police state. Non-criminal justice approaches to addiction
can be extremely useful, even if criminalization also can help. There is no
reason to believe that our thinking about addiction must be polar, that it is only
brain disease or only intentional conduct, that it is best treated only medically
or psychologically or only by criminalization. Addiction-related conduct can be
both a sign of brain disease and intentional action, both a proper subject for
treatment and for moral judgment.
No one suggests that we should criminalize and punish the status of being an
addict. Indeed, doing so would be unconstitutional.117 Moreover, failure to
criminalize recreational substance use is no guarantee of an effective social
response. Two of the most addictive drugs, ethanol (alcohol) and nicotine,
which cause untold personal and social harm, are entirely lawful, freely
available, and relatively inexpensive. The medical model’s preferred mode of
response to seeking and using these lawful substances is largely unfettered by
115. John Monahan et al., Use of Leverage to Improve Adherence to Psychiatric Treatment in the
Community, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 37, 37 (2005).
116. See John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient Commitment,
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1198, 1199–1204 (2001) (citing evidence for efficacy of mandated outpatient
treatment but querying whether legally mandated treatment is necessary to achieve this result).
117. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that criminal punishment solely for
the status of being addicted is cruel and unusual and thus constitutionally impermissible under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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nasty criminalization, but the problems these substances cause remain grave.
When people manage to quit—as many do—it is more a response to reason and
self-efficacy generally than a result of medical or psychological intervention in
the addicts’ brains or minds.
Few people who adopt a unitary medical model suggest that production,
possession, sale, and use of currently illicit drugs should be entirely
decriminalized and deregulated. Criminal justice apparently plays a necessary
role concerning these drug activities.118
Seeking and using drugs are
distinguishable from production, sale, and other criminal activities related to
drug use. Even if one desired on “medical grounds” to decriminalize possession
for personal use and such use itself, few would argue further that we should
decriminalize or deregulate production, possession for sale, sale itself, or other
property and personal crimes that might be part of the drug life or necessary to
support addiction. Unless the authorities have some legal tool, such as the
threat of criminal sanctions or enhanced punishment, to coerce users to accept
treatment, many, perhaps most, will not do so willingly. Most addicts already
know the other good reasons they ought to enter treatment, but many engage in
denial and other defense mechanisms that may prevent them from keeping such
reasons present to their minds. Finally, given the limited success of available
treatment programs, the criminal justice response may ultimately be more
effective at reducing drug use than providing treatment, and indeed, may
protect liberty more than a paternalistic treatment approach.119 Indeed, some
sophisticated observers believe that general decriminalization would produce
catastrophic increases in addiction.120 The important questions, of course, are
what the proper role of moral evaluation and criminal justice should be and
whether this role is inconsistent with sensible medical responses, such as
treatment. Common sense suggests that all such approaches are not necessarily
inconsistent and can be simultaneously and usefully employed.
One reform that might do much to reduce both drug-related harms and
criminal justice costs would be limited decriminalization of small amounts of
substances possessed solely for personal use and simple use itself, coupled with
enhanced enforcement of common, further drug-related harms.121 Consider by
analogy our response to drunk driving. Adult possession and use of alcohol is

118. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 528–31 (1968).
119. Id. Writing for the plurality, Justice Marshall wrote that there might be deterrent and civil
liberties virtues to using the criminal justice system to respond to the behavioral consequences of
alcoholism. Id. We have learned a great deal about the causes and consequences of alcoholism since
this 1968 opinion, but the reasoning is still applicable.
120. See James Q. Wilson, What To Do About Crime, 98 COMMENT. 25 (1994).
121. Proposing any form of decriminalization of currently illicit substances raises enormously
complicated and extremely controversial issues. For the purposes of this paper, however, the full
argument cannot be produced. I can only gesture superficially and conclusorily at the recommended
approach. For a balanced, data-driven analysis of the costs and benefits of decriminalization, see
ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES,
TIMES, & PLACES (2001). See also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR
RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992).
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not criminal, but the carnage produced by intoxicated drivers is wellunderstood. Prohibition would surely reduce the carnage, but, as we learned
during our experiment with this approach, it produces vast harms of its own. A
potentially sensible approach would more strictly enforce laws against drunk
driving, which is probably the most foreseeably dangerous alcohol-related
behavior. Similarly, limited decriminalization of currently illicit substances
would probably not have catastrophic social effects and would almost certainly
avoid the many appalling costs that our complete war on illicit substances now
produces. Using produces harms primarily to oneself and might be better
approached medically than legally. This regime certainly would facilitate
voluntary seeking of treatment by addicts and others with drug problems.
A second promising reform would be diversion from the criminal justice
system of minor drug-related offenders coupled with treatment in cases in
which treatment seems likely to be successful.122 The drug courts that have been
established in many states are one attempt to provide such diversion and
treatment.123 This approach is controversial for many of the reasons that
involuntary treatment generally raises questions, but avoiding the necessity of
costly imprisonment and inducing treatment for minor offenders engaged in
drug-related criminal activities is potentially cost-effective, especially if more
effective and safe treatment modalities become available.
Limited decriminalization has much to recommend it as a solution to drugrelated problems. Nevertheless, in the current climate of opinion concerning
controlled substances, it seems very unlikely that Congress, whose power over
drug regulation is near absolute,124 will move toward any form of
decriminalization.
X
CONCLUSION
Despite the exciting, undoubted advances in the biological understanding of
addiction, and despite the plausibility of considering addictions diseases, the
disease model does not and cannot fully explain addiction or inform social and
legal policy concerning addiction. Addiction inevitably involves human action
and is therefore subject to moral evaluation. Although addiction might cause a
condition warranting mitigation or excuse, primarily by compromising
rationality, there is good reason to believe that most addicts are responsible for
122. Douglas Longshore, Angela Hawken, Darren Urada & M. Douglas Anglin, SAPCA Cost
Analysis Report (First and Second Years), available at http://www.uclaisap.org/prop36/documents/
SACPA_COSTANALYSIS.pdf at 21–23 (2006) (studying the costs and benefits of a legislativelymandated diversion program that offered probation and treatment to non-violent drug offenders found
that incarceration costs were substantially reduced, that there were greater cost savings for some
eligible offenders than for others, and that the program could be improved).
123. See generally DRUG COURTS: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002).
124. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (holding that Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority includes the power to prohibit local cultivation and use of marijuana for medical purposes
that is in compliance with state law).
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seeking-and-using behavior and for other immoral or criminal activity related to
addiction. For those who may not be fully responsible, however, modification
of the existing doctrines of mitigation and excuse would be necessary to
respond fairly to the claims of diminished responsibility addicts might present.
Finally, although the criminal justice system might play a useful role in
responding to addiction-related action, non-criminal, non-judgmental
interventions also should play a substantial role. The criminal justice system
response should be limited and reformed to enhance the potential efficacy of
treatment approaches.
XI
POSTSCRIPT: BECOMING AN ADDICT
Let us start with pre-addiction use. Before they reach the age of reason,
some children and many early and middle adolescents have substantial
experience with alcohol, nicotine, and other drugs, and a small number of them
become problem users. Moreover, early experimentation with substances such
as nicotine is highly predictive of later behavior that risks health. Still, the
simplifying assumption will be made that virtually all people do not have their
first substantial experience with potentially addicting substances until they are
mid-adolescents, an age at which adolescents are in general cognitively
indistinguishable from adults.125
By the age of reason, any competent person knows generally about the
dangers of addicting substances. Most people who use potentially addicting
substances do not become addicts, but between fifteen and seventeen percent
do.126 On the other hand, they may misestimate the risks of becoming addicted
and especially underestimate how bad it will feel to be addicted.127 Experience
with and empathy for those already addicted is simply no substitute for the real
thing. Consequently, perhaps addicts are not fully responsible for their
addictions because they operate with insufficient information. This claim
appears plausible and not unlike one objection to advanced directives for health
care. For example, if one has never faced death or has never faced it while fully
competent, how does the person know what she would really want under the
circumstances? Although plausible, this claim seems too strong. There is
sufficiently good information as a result of both observation and indirect
sources about the perils of addiction to warrant the conclusion that those who
take drugs understand the risks sufficiently to be held responsible if addiction

125. See Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 52–
56 (1997) (reviewing evidence that the formal reasoning powers of middle and late adolescents are
indistinguishable from those of adults, but recognizing that there may be behavioral differences
involving impulsiveness and susceptibility to peer pressure).
126. Deroche-Gamonet et al., supra note 33, at 1014. The authors refer to this as a “small
proportion” of those using, but it is hardly an insignificant risk of an injurious disorder and the number
is surely higher in identifiable at-risk populations.
127. See ELSTER, supra note 51, at 185.
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ensues. After all, as long as people have general normative competence,
including the ability to gather relevant information, perfect information is
hardly required for responsibility.
One can deny that any drug use is rational because all drug use is immoral
and choosing immorality is always irrational. Claiming generically that
immorality is irrational is philosophically controversial, of course, and in this
specific context it suggests a highly moralistic, virtue ethics. Why, precisely, is
limited experimentation immoral? Because it feels good? Does all such use
degrade the moral personality? Perhaps so. But, after all, limited initial
experience genuinely hooks almost no one—even if the experimental or
recreational user is a member of a genetically or socially at-risk population and
especially if the diagnostic brain changes almost always require repeated use.128
The usual response to claims that experimentation is not necessarily
irrational is that the process of addiction is insidious. No single instance of use
seems to cross a threshold; the process is instead stealthily additive, a slippery
slope. At some point, however, the addict is hooked without realizing it.
Because no initial user can predict whether and when he or she specifically will
become addicted, it is always irrational to start or to continue, even if one is not
yet hooked. There is truth to this response, but the insidiousness of the
addiction process is well -known generally and proto-addicts are usually aware
that they are developing a problem before the problem becomes a diagnosable
addiction. They may, of course, be “in denial” or using other defense
mechanisms, such as rationalization, to avoid insight into their own conditions,
but the use of defense mechanisms, an imperfect shield at best, is not an
excusing condition that morality and law will recognize when serious harms
occur. Again, one need not act on perfect information to be responsible. It is
difficult to resist the conclusion that most and perhaps all use prior to addiction
is conduct for which the user is responsible and has some awareness of the risk
of potential addiction. Consequently, it is also difficult to resist concluding that
most addicts are responsible for becoming addicted.
Most addictions probably occur as a result of conscious and not-so-conscious
indifference to the risk of becoming addicted, but plausibly it may be rational in
some cases to choose intentionally to become an addict and to enter the
addictive “life.” This claim should be distinguished from the controversial
arguments made by Gary Becker and others that addiction is itself rational.129
My argument is that it can be rational to choose to become irrational, assuming,
arguendo, that at least some addicts are irrational about their lives when they
are addicted.

128. Peter W. Kalivas & Nora D. Volkow, The Neural Basis of Addiction: A Pathology of
Motivation and Choice, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1403, 1405–06 (2005) (finding repeated use of
addictive drugs induces structural changes in neural circuitry).
129. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Rational Addiction, in ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 50
(1996).
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Imagine a young person who has lived an extraordinarily deprived life and
who therefore has little human capital and few prospects. It is possible that the
person could acquire the life skills and education needed to beat the odds, but
rational calculation would suggest that the odds are overwhelmingly against
success. In such circumstances, one can easily imagine that a life of intermittent
“highs” or oblivion, for example, would be preferable to a clean, straight life,
despite the threat of poverty, disease, and prison. Such a life would be a limited
but manageable, employing substances to help ignore or alleviate the misery of
existence. Choosing such a life would be quite rational.130
Even if consciously risking or intentionally choosing to become an addict is
not rational behavior, responsibility for conduct does not require acting for
good, rational reasons. It is sufficient that the agent retain the general capacity
for rationality. Until addiction occurs—and perhaps thereafter—there is little
reason to believe that otherwise responsible agents do not retain this general
capacity.
Finally, few people are compelled to become addicted. Peer pressure to
experiment may be common in adolescence and early adulthood, but it seldom
takes a form that would justify a compulsion excuse. First use is almost always
intentional and in most cases rational, because virtually no one is immediately
hooked or harmed. The user tries the substance to please friends, for the thrill
of experimenting or being on the edge, for the pleasure or arousal the substance
produces, and for a host of other reasons that do not suggest excusing
irrationality. Moreover, almost no one is literally forced to become an addict by
the involuntary administration of substances.131
In conclusion, most people who become addicts may fairly be held
responsible to a substantial degree for becoming addicted. To the extent that
addicts seek to use their addiction as a mitigating or excusing circumstance
when they are charged with crimes related to the addiction, they become
vulnerable to the claim that they have caused the condition of their own excuse
and, therefore, should not be excused. This is a form of strict liability, however,
and becoming an addict is distinguishable from committing crimes once one is
addicted. Indeed, in some cases, such as adherence to a properly prescribed
regime of addictive analgesics, becoming addicted may be entirely lawful. The
better reason to hold most addicts criminally responsible most of the time—
however they became addicted—is that most of the time they retain a sufficient
capacity for rationality to be held responsible.132

130. Although addicts may be largely responsible for becoming addicts and also responsible for
much of their drug-related activity while addicted, our society should try to help change the odds for
those in my not-hypothetical example.
131. Infants born to addicted mothers might be an exception, but this exceptional case does not
undermine the general argument.
132. See supra Part VIII.B.2.

